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This Article maintains that the rapid pace of technological ad-
vances requires that courts take an activist posture in intellec-
tual property cases by updating the Copyright Act and the
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I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 771
A. Federal Preem ption ................................................ 775
B. Fair Use ................................ ................ 779
C. State Trade Secret Protection ..................................... 785
II. THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ............... 788
A. Computers and Computer Programs ................................. 789
1. PATENT LAW PROTECTION ......................................... 790
2. COPYRIGHT ACT PROTECTION ...................................... 793
a. Overlap with State Trade Secret Protection .................. 795
b. Copyright Protection for Video Games ....................... 798
c. Copyright Protection for Computer Technology ............... 799
d. Copyright Protection for Artificial Intelligence ................ 802
B . Cable Television ................................................... 804
1. THE COURT AND THE FCC ......................................... 805
2. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE .................................... 810
a. T eletext ................................................... 812
b. H om e Satellite Dishes ...................................... 814
Il1. HOME VIDEOTAPING-FAIR USE OR INFRINGEMENT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
IV . C ONCLUSION ............................................................. 827
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans. LL.M.,
Yale Law School; J.D., Southern Methodist University School of Law.
I am indebted to Guido Calabresi of the Yale Law School and Lorne Tepperman of the
University of Toronto for comments on a draft of this article. Additionally, Stuart Robino-
witz of the New York law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison provoked my
thinking on a number of issues. Nevertheless, final responsibility for the opinions expressed
rests solely with me. This is especially worth noting with regard to Calabresi, for although
this Article extends the ideas in his book to a particular area of the law, we differ somewhat
in how those ideas should apply.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Guido, Calabresi has written a provocative book about the
"statutorification" of American law, a neologism intended to be as
ugly as the condition it describes.' Like his intellectual progenitor
Grant Gilmore, Calabresi decries the "orgy of statute making" that
has shifted the initiative from courts to legislatures.2 As a result, in
A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, Calabresi attempts to
fashion a theory of judicial revision of statutes and a defense for
that position. Courts, he says, ought to be as free to alter a statute
as they are to change one of their own decisions by the common
law method.'
The problem that animates the book is obsolescence. Calabresi
is concerned that out-of-date statutes may remain in force while
courts declare themselves powerless to update them. Alternatively,
courts may resort to a variety of devices to change the law but in a
less than candid way. Instead, Calabresi wants courts to forge
ahead honestly. Courts ought to decide when a retentionist bias is
appropriate." When it is not, courts should have the ability to
change the law or to threaten to change it if a legislature does not
act.5 Consequently, if Calabresi's theory is in fact helpful, it ought
to show its value in an area of law that is constantly forced to up-
date: intellectual property.
Thus arises the mission of this Article: to examine the chal-
lenges that new technology places on the copyright and patent law
systems for evidence that the system would be better served by
courts taking a more active role. The home videotaping issue re-
solved by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc." is the most recent example of such a chal-
lenge. The Copyright Act does not directly address the issue. One
side urged the Court to hold the practice a violation of the Act and
to devise a remedy such as a "tax" on the sale of tapes. The other
side wanted the Court to hold that home taping was fair use. The
Court opted for the latter, choosing to let Congress address home
videotaping in specific legislation.
Under Calabresi's theory, courts should decide these questions
1. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
2. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977).
3. G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 165-66.
4. Id. at 164.
5. Id. Put another way, Calabresi's position is that the common law function to be exer-
cised by courts is "no more and no less than the critical task of deciding when a retention-
ist or a revisionist bias is appropriately applied to an existing statutory or common law
rule." Id. at 164.
6. 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984); see infra notes 219-72 and accompanying text.
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not by tugging the language of a statute to allow a strained inter-
pretation, but rather by forthrightly considering the issue involved
and changing the law, if necessary, to treat like cases alike.' The
consequences of such an approach to a unified statutory system of
intellectual property would be significant. In the pages that follow,
I will attempt to determine whether they would be significantly
better or worse.
I. INTRODUCTION
By nature, copyright and patent laws must accommodate new
technology. Patent, by definition, concerns the protection of that
which has not existed before.8 Thus, it is impossible for a statute
to specify the items it will protect. All it can do is set forth the
conditions under which inventions will be entitled to patent pro-
tection. Under the current law, the primary criteria are novelty,
utility, originality, and nonobviousness.'
Similarly, people are continually finding new ways of expres-
sing themselves, often through new inventions that themselves
might be patented. Thus, a copyright statute cannot specify all the
modes of expression that qualify for protection. Rather, it should
only describe the attributes of expression that it pro-
tects-currently, original works of authorship. 0 Under both patent
7. G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 165.
8. The first patent statute is thought to have been enacted in Venice during the thir-
teenth or fourteenth century. It provided: "If somebody invents any machine or process to
speed up silkmaking or to improve it, and if the idea is actually useful, the inventor can
obtain an exclusive privilege for ten years from the General Welfare Board of the Republic."
Prager, The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 106,
130-31 (1952).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title."
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982) provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically dis-
closed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject mat-
ter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made.
10. Section 102 of the Copyright Act does acknowledge the futility of attempting to
anticipate technology. It extends protection to "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
19841
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and copyright, an idea itself is insufficient. To be patentable, an
invention must be reduced to practice.1 To be copyrightable, a
work must be "fixed in any tangible medium of expression."12
The continuing challenge of intellectual property law is not
deciding how to treat new creations that are sui generis. Rather, it
is determining whether a new thing is like an old. Put another way,
it is the classic problem of the common law: treating like cases
alike.' That being so, the argument for judicial activism is a
strong one-courts, not legislatures, are the bodies with experience
in such matters.
Historically, courts have indeed addressed these issues and no
less successfully than legislatures. In 1884, the Supreme Court in
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony"I faced the question of
whether a photographer could be considered an author within the
meaning of the copyright clause of the Constitution and the then-
existing copyright statute. The answer to this question lay not in
the physics of photography but rather in an examination of the
actions of the photographer.
Is a photograph of Oscar Wilde (the picture at issue) an origi-
nal work of authorship? No, said the defendant. The camera sim-
ply makes a mechanical transfer of nature. To the contrary, replied
the Court. The photographer, like a writer, had an original mental
conception that he brought into physical form. He posed Wilde in
a particular position. He selected the costume and background. He
or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). The section then goes on to specify some existing works
of authorship included in the Act.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1982). An inventor who does not exercise due diligence in reduc-
ing his conception to practice loses his priority of claims under the Act. Id. Actual reduction
in the form of a model or prototype is not always necessary. Constructive reduc-
tion-disclosing the idea in the patent application and showing how it could be carried
out-generally will suffice. See generally Bowers v. Valley, 149 F.2d 284, 286 (C.C.P.A.
1945) (activities amounted to a reduction of the invention to practice). No protection, how-
ever, can be given to a naked idea. Thus, litigation in patent cases commonly concerns the
sufficiency of the reduction. Compare Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 328
(2d Cir. 1963) (mock-up of optical device used by airplane gunners was sufficiently reduced
to practice, although never tested in airplane) with Radio Corp. of Am. v. International
Standard Elec. Corp., 232 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1956) (airplane radar system tested only on top
of office building not reduced to practice).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
13. This is not to say that all courts would reach the same result in any case. Judges
may engage in comparisons at different levels of generality. The strength of the common law
method is that it facilitates the creation of a legal topography consisting of the opinions of a
number of courts. Over time, a dominant position is likely to emerge. In the meantime, at
least the individual cases are resolved in a manner that considers something more than what
a legislative body said before this technology arose. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 165.
14. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
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arranged the lighting. Thus, the Court held that photographers
were authors, as were engravers, whom the Act specifically men-
tioned.1 5 The common law process was sufficient to answer the
question.
The Supreme Court in 1908 could have used the same process
to decide whether a perforated player piano roll was a copy of a
piece of music; does an unauthorized piano roll infringe the copy-
right in a song just as an unauthorized copy of the sheet music
does? Although that was the issue in White-Smith Music Publish-
ing Co. v. Apollo Co.,"6 Justice Day concerned himself with legisla-
tive intent and statutory interpretation. "In the last analysis," Day
wrote, "this case turns upon the construction of a statute, for it is
perfectly well settled that the protection given to copyrights in this
country is wholly statutory." 7
Having made that statement, Justice Day compared piano
rolls to music boxes and other devices that reproduce music
mechanically. These devices were known to Congress when it
passed the Copyright Act. "Can it be," he asked, "that it was the
intention of Congress to permit them to be held as infringements
and suppressed by injunctions?"1 8 No, he decided.
Only at the end of his opinion did Justice Day come close to
the heart of the problem-a piano roll is like a piece of sheet music
because, in the absence of any legal restriction, the manufacturer
enjoys the use of the composition without having to pay for it."9
Nonetheless, Day said, "such considerations properly address
themselves to the legislative and not to the judicial branch of the
Government. 20
Considering these two cases together, the approach of the for-
mer case seems to be much more satisfying than that of the latter.
In the photography case, the Court extended the principle of af-
fording certain economic advantages to creative people to include a
new form of art. In the piano roll case, the Court arbitrarity distin-
guished between the old technology and the new. The Court.
treated like cases differently due primarily to the Court's reticence
to update the law on its own. Consistency was sacrificed on the
altar of deference to the legislature. In response, Congress was
15. Id. at 58-59.
16. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
17. Id. at 15.
18. Id. at 18.
19. Id.
20. Id.
19841
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forced to legislate. The next year, it passed a new copyright law
that included mechanical reproductions of music21 within the scope
of "copy."22 The delay, however, was unnecessary and, if the ra-
tionale underlying Justice Day's opinion were carried to the ex-
treme, coverage would have been withheld from any invention un-
til Congress specifically mentioned it.
Justice Day's deference, however unlaudable, is nonetheless
understandable. The Constitution gives Congress power to grant
copyrights,23 and since the first Congress, the legislators have exer-
cised this power. 24 Day and many of his successors have been re-
luctant to interfere with Congress's control of copyright. As a re-
sult, even most of the "activist" decisionmaking has gone on under
the guise of interpretation. This is akin to the subterfuge of which
Calabresi speaks.25 Subterfuge, however, depends on the willing-
ness of courts to engage in diversionary tactics. Unwilling to as-
sume an "activist" posture in White-Smith, the Supreme Court
reached a result that was inconsistent with the result in Burrow-
Giles, where the Court held that the Act protected a
photographer.2 6
Calabresi, in contrast, proposes a guilt-free jurisprudence, one
that would allow a court either to reform a law that is out of date-
for -example, a copyright statute that deals only with old forms of
copying-or simply to declare that the law is out of date and not
enforce it, thus pushing Congress to update. Under his proposal,
courts would not do anything they do not do already. Instead, they
21. Section 1(e) of the 1909 Act defined performance as "any arrangement or setting of
it or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any form of record in which the
thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced." It
also created a licensing system for music with a statutory royalty. 1909 Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat.
1075.
22. The broad definition of "copy" in the 1909 Act carried over into the 1976 Act.
"Copies" are defined in the 1976 Act as "material objects, other than phonorecords [which
are treated separately], in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later devel-
oped, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
23. "The Congress shall have Power. . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. See Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
25. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 173.
26. Despite his reliance on the statute, Justice Day did take account of the legal terrain
in a limited sense. He cited two lower court and two foreign decisions that a piano roll was
not a copy of the music. 209 U.S. at 12-14. Justice Holmes found the decision to be anoma-
lous but concurred in the judgment because of these precedents. Id. at 18-19 (Holmes, J.,
concurring).
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openly would reform the Copyright Act or force Congress to do
SO.
27
A. Federal Preemption
Under the current copyright statute Congress seemingly has
asserted jurisdiction over all forms of copyright protection. Prior to
the 1976 Act, copyright ran on two tracks. The first was common
law copyright, a creature of the courts. Until a work was pub-
lished-made generally available-it fell under this regime. The
author maintained the right to determine if and when a work
would be published. This right remained in effect indefinitely.28 In-
deed, section two of the 1909 Act expressly disclaimed any inter-
ference with "the right of the author or proprietor of an unpub-
lished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying,
publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent,
and to obtain damages therefor. ' 21
Once a work was published, common law copyright came to an
end. The author then had the responsibility of securing his rights
on the second track-statutory copyright. The 1976 Act preempts
all legal or equitable common law rights equivalent to those
granted in the Act,30 thereby putting common law copyright out of
business." Under the 1976 Act, publication is no longer relevant,
because the statute now protects a work from the moment of
creation.32
Exactly how much copyright legislation has preempted legal
and equitable common law rights was a subject of concern under
the old Act, and the 1976 Act fails to alleviate this concern. In two
1964 cases dealing with patent law, the Supreme Court held that
states could not offer unfair competition protection to inventors of
27. Neither of the two reasons for subterfuge Calabresi identifies applies to the updat-
ing of the Copyright and Patent Acts. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 172-73. Judicial
updating in this instance does not mask some fundamental value conflict that is too destruc-,
tive to acknowledge publicly. Neither is it necessary to prevent courts from going too far. Id.
The value choices already have been made. The task for judges is to apply those choices to
the new technology. If anything, courts have been excessively timid in making intellectual
property protection comport with new technology. The problem is not runaway lawmaking
but rather law that lags behind.
28. See generally 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.01 (1983).
29. 1909 Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1076 (amended 1976).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
31. "[N]o person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work
under the common law or statutes of any State." Id.
32. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 302(a) (1982). This change gives rise to perplexing questions re-
garding manuscripts written on computers. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
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unpatentable items.13 In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., Sears
copied a pole lamp that was not patentable for want of invention.
In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., Compco Corporation
copied the design of an unpatentable commercial lighting fixture.
In both cases, the Court concluded that the supremacy clause of
the Constitution prevented states from contradicting the federal
intellectual property laws. If a work or product did not meet the
criteria necessary for federal protection, it was in the public do-
main, and the states could not prevent others from freely copying
it.
On the other hand, just because anyone was free to copy an
item did not mean he was free to palm it off as the original. Thus,
the Court said that a state could require proper labeling or packag-
ing to identify the original source of the item. 4 To use the par-
lance of the later 1976 Copyright Act, such a requirement was not
an "equivalent right. ' 35 Consequently, state action in this area did
not interfere with the federal system.
The Court's pronouncements of preemption in Sears and
Compco were to plague it in a later case under the 1909 Copyright
Act. The problem in Goldstein v. Californias was simple: the stat-
ute was out of date. It did not explicitly allow copyright in phono-
graph records, and the Justices did not believe they could update
the Act themselves. Moreover, in the patent cases they had deliv-
ered a strong message of federal hegemony in intellectual property.
Now, they were faced with a California statute that criminalized
record and tape piracy, and a defense that the 1909 Act preempted
the state statute.3 7
33. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
34. 376 U.S. at 232.
35. See supra note 31.
36. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
37. The defendants argued that the state copyright statute conflicted with congres-
sional policy, and that the supremacy clause of the Constitution preempted the statute. 412
U.S. at 551. Furthermore, although the Copyright Act was amended while this case was
pending to extend federal protection to sound recordings, the 1971 Amendment by its terms
did not apply retroactively to the sound recordings involved in Goldstein. Id. at 551-52.
Records and tapes, the defendants argued, were mechanical reproductions, and the legisla-
tive history of the 1909 Act showed that Congress did not intend to extend copyright protec-
tion to the reproductions themselves, only to the underlying music. Id. at 564. Thus, the
defendants contended, neither state nor federal copyright law afforded copyright protection
of the sound recordings in Goldstein.
In support of their argument that the 1909 Act did not protect sound recordings, the
defendants cited the House Report that stated: "It is not the intention of the committee to
extend the right of copyright to the mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give
[Vol. 38:769
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The California statute at issue in Goldstein was designed to
fill the gap in the Copyright Act and afford protection to the own-
ers of the master records and tapes. In the guise of interpretation,
Chief Justice Burger wrote:
[W]e must remember that our modern technology differs greatly
from that which existed in 1909. The Act and the [legislative]
report should not be read as if they were written today, for to do
so would inevitably distort their intended meaning; rather, we
must read them against the background of 1909, in which they
were written."
Having said that, Burger recounted the White-Smith case and
the congressional response that extended rights to composers
whose works were used in mechanical reproductions. Burger noted,
however, that nowhere in the legislative report did Congress indi-
cate that state copyright protection that does not conflict with fed-
eral copyright protection may not govern records as artistic cre-
ations.3 9 The question, according to the majority opinion, was
whether the state protection conflicted with the federal Copyright
Act.40
The majority answered that in this case it did not-a curious
conclusion in light of Sears and Compco. Burger wrote that copy-
right was not a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction:
[I]t is unlikely that all citizens in all parts of the country place
the same importance on works relating to all subjects. Since the
subject matter to which the Copyright Clause is addressed may
thus be of purely local importance and not worthy of national
attention or protection, we cannot discern such an unyielding
national interest as to require an inference that state power to
grant copyrights has been relinquished to exclusive federal
control.'
Of course, the record industry is a national industry, just as it
was in 1973 when the court decided Goldstein. The California stat-
ute was nothing more than a stop-gap measure until Congress leg-
islated on the subject. Congress extended copyright protection
while the Goldstein suit was pending but only for records fixed
the composer or copyright proprietor the control, in accordance with the provisions of the
bill, of the manufacture and use of such devices." H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1909).
38. 412 U.S. at 564.
39. Id. at 558-59.
40. Id. at 561.
41. Id. at 557-58.
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after February 15, 1972.42 Burger's decision allowed the good guys
to win, but it did so at the cost of candor. The state law was incon-
sistent with the Copyright Act. It allowed unlimited protection to a
form of authorship that the federal Act did not even include.43
What else might the Supreme Court have done? The fact that
a criminal conviction was at stake prevented it from creating an ex
post facto law. Moreover, Congress had just differentiated pre-1972
sound recordings from later ones. Faced with such a recent legisla-
tive action that consciously treated like cases differently, the Court
was as pains to alter the balance. Had Congress not yet spoken, the
Court might have adopted the Calabresi approach and updated the
law itself. Given the existing circumstances, though, that option
was not available.
Perhaps the Court should have avoided the question by deny-
ing certiorari. The lower courts had upheld the conviction under
the state statute. More importantly, the case was to be a vehicle
for updating the law, but Congress had already done that. By hear-
ing the case and announcing a principle of nonexclusivity based
more on expedience than coherence, the Court only created confu-
sion. In Goldstein, the greatest virtue would have been what Pro-
fessor Alexander Bickel called the "passive virtue.""
The 1976 Copyright Revision Act reflects the significance of
Goldstein because the new Act preempts only equivalent rights
within its subject matter. Unfortunately, the Act's legislative his-
tory is unclear as to what the 1976 Act preempts. Professor Nim-
mer has observed that the version of section 301, which is the pre-
emption section, that reached the House floor expressly excluded
the common law action of misappropriation from preemption. 5
42. See supra note 37.
43. 412 U.S. at 550-51.
44. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962); Bickel, Foreword: The
Passive Virtues to The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). But see
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expe-
diency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
45. M. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT 495-97 (2d ed. 1979). The Su-
preme Court upheld the misappropriation doctrine in International News Serv. v. Associ-
ated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), a case in which the Court restrained INS from taking the
AP's uncopyrighted news dispatches from bulletin boards and early editions of newspapers
and then sending them to INS subscribers until the commercial value of the dispatches had
passed. INS is of doubtful significance today because the Court decided it before Congress
enacted the Copyright Act preemption section, before Sears and Cornpco, and because the
Court decided it as a matter of general federal common law before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315
(1st Cir. 1967) (television network not liable for alleged misappropriation of plaintiff's char-
acter and idea for cards bearing the words "Have Gun Will Travel," in the absence of plain-
[Vol. 38:769
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During debate, Congressman Seiberling asked that the misappro-
priation example be removed from the statute. Otherwise, he said,
it "could easily be construed by the courts as authorizing the
States to pass misappropriation laws . . . [that] could be so broad
as to render the preemption section meaningless."' 6
In a later dialogue, however, Seiberling said that his purpose
was to "leave . . . [existing] State law alone."' 7 With that assur-
ance, Congressman Railsback (the ranking Republican on the sub-
committee that reported out the bill) gave his assent to the amend-
ment.'" Nimmer noted that if Seiberling wanted to enforce
preemption, he could not have wanted to leave state law alone.' 9
The subcommittee chairman, Congressman Kastenmeier, then
added to the confusion by accepting the amendment because of his
understanding that it was consistent with the Justice Department's
position, which was that they should removethe language so as to
eliminate any doubt about the full preemptive effect of the bill.50
Thus, the Democratic and Republican leaders of the subcommittee
endorsed the change, each one thinking it meant something differ-
ent.' The bill passed, but the intent of Congress on preemption
hardly can be called obvious.
Thus, Congress has been unclear about the role of common
law actions in the area of copyright, and the Supreme Court has
made the test of preemption even more opaque. That being the
case, state law on intellectual property is something more than just
a matter of intellectual curiosity. Indeed, one of the pressing issues
presented by new technology is whether one can claim both federal
copyright and state trade secret protection on computer software.
Section II of this Article discusses this matter. It is a question that
neither the "plain meaning" of the Copyright Act nor its legislative
history can answer.
B. Fair Use
One thing is clear about the current Copyright Act: Congress
tiff's attempt to obtain copyright in cards). Nevertheless, the Court's decision in Goldstein
places the Copyright Act preemption section in question insofar as it supports the notion
that a misappropriation action might be decided as a matter of state law. But see Mitchell
v. Penton/Indus. Publishing Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 242 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
46. 122 CONG. REc. 32,015 (1976).
47. Id.
48. Id. The amendment was adopted. Id.
49. M. NIMMER, supra note 45, at 496-97.
50. 122 CONG. REc. 32,015 (1976).
51. M. NIMMER, supra note 45, at 497.
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has recognized that statutory language is insufficient to resolve all
disputes over infringement. As a result, it included the "fair use"
provision in the Act.2 Actually, fair use owes its origin not to Con-
gress but rather to the common law method. It is a doctrine that
developed in the courts as a gloss on statutory copyright. Put sim-
ply, fair use allows courts to restrict copyright infringement claims
when they seem overly harsh. Instead of mechanically applying the
statute, courts balance the defendant's use against the plaintiff's
rights to reach a reasonable result. 3
Section 107 codifies the fair use doctrine and enumerates sev-
eral factors to be considered-factors that emanate from the com-
mon law cases. In effect, the legislature has realized that courts are
better equipped to make these decisions on an individual basis.
5 4
Congress cannot legislate on every conceivable use of copyrighted
material. Similarly, one might observe, it cannot legislate on every
conceivable form of technology by means of which authors may ex-
press themselves."5 If the former is an appropriate subject matter
52. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholar-
ship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
Congress specifically did not provide an exact definition of fair use in the 1976 Copy-
right Revision Act, preferring to delegate to the courts the case by case adjudication of such
matters. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5659, 5678.
53. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978); Rosemont En-
ters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009
(1967). See generally M. NIMMER, supra note 28, at § 13.05 (1983); Seltzer, Exemptions and
Fair Use in Copyright: The "Exclusive Rights" Tension in the New Copyright Act, 24
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 215 (1977).
54. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5659, 5678.
55. The House report recognizes the necessarily dynamic nature of the fair use doc-
trine: "[Section 1071 endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair
use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a
period of rapid technological change." Id. at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5680.
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for judicial activism, then the latter is a likely candidate for such
treatment as well.
The argument made here is not that the courts should have
exclusive power over updating copyright law. Rather, it is that they
should not shy away from providing the starting point for revision.
Fair use, for example, served as the basis for the Court of Claims
decision in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,"' the major
case involving photocopying. At issue was the copying of articles
from professional journals by a government medical research or-
ganization and its library. The court, in a decision later affirmed by
an equally divided Supreme Court, held the practice to be fair use.
More interesting than the holding, though, is the court's mes-
sage to Congress. In effect, it forced the legislature's hand with its
ruling because attention to the problem became crucial. The court
correctly identified the problem as one of statutory obsolescence.
The 1909 Act did not cover photocopying57 because the technology
did not exist. Given that state of affairs, the court had a choice:
either update the statute itself or force Congress to do it. It chose
the latter course.
In so doing, the Court of Claims rejected the suggestion that it
create a licensing system.58 The court reasoned that such a system
would interfere with the copyright owner's right to completely pre-
vent copying of his material, if he so chose. The court was unwill-
ing to force him to accept a licensing arrangement. Instead, it
viewed the case as "but a 'holding operation' in the interim period
before Congress enacts its preferred solution":59
The truth is that this is now preeminently a problem for
Congress: to decide the extent [sic] photocopying should be al-
lowed, the questions of a compulsory license and the payments
(if any) to the copyright owners, the system for collecting those
payments (lump-sum, clearing-house, etc.), the special status (if
any) of scientific and educational needs .... Intermediate or
compromise solutions are not within our authority.0
Judge Nichols dissented from the majority's conclusion and its
reticence to act affirmatively. "However, hedged," he wrote, "the
decision will be read, that a copyright holder has no rights a li-
brary is bound to respect. We are making the Dred Scott decision
56. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. C1. 1973), af/'d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
57. 487 F.2d at 1350-51.
58. Id. at 1360.
59. Id. at 1363.
60. Id. at 1360.
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of copyright law."6
Indeed, the court could have done more had it not viewed its
latitude so restrictively. It might have threatened to implement a
solution if Congress did not act. It might have enacted some sort of
system until the legislature did respond. Perhaps the court viewed
judicial sabre-rattling as unnecessary in that case because the Cop-
yright Act was in the process of being revised, and Congress was
aware of the problem new technology was creating.
Congress did respond, albeit incompletely. Just as with the
current problem of home videotaping, no congressman yearned to
be known as the one who led the fight to restrict photocopying.
Section 108 of the 1976 Act directly addresses reproduction by li-
braries and archives. Copying by individual users remains a ques-
tion of fair use. The Act specifically exempts libraries from liability
for the unsupervised use of copying equipment located on their
premises, provided that such equipment displays a notice that "the
making of a copy may be subject to the copyright law." 2
Since the 1976 Act, of course, photocopying has continued un-
abated. No one has yet been spotted turning away from a library
Xerox machine after reading the required notice. Congress does re-
quire reports from the Register of Copyrights every five years on
"the extent to which this section has achieved the intended statu-
tory balancing of the rights of creators, and the needs of users. "63
The first report, delivered in January of 1983, recommended col-
lective photocopy license agreements, the study of surcharges on
copying equipment, and the sampling of selected machine usage as
techniques for gauging compensation."
Knowing now that congressional action has been largely inef-
fective in dealing with the problem created by new technology, can
it be said that the best solution was for the Williams & Wilkins
court to defer to Congress? If the court instead had imposed a li-
censing system of its own design and that licensing system had
61. Id. at 1387 (Nichols, J., dissenting).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 108(0(1) (1982). Section 107 includes copying for classroom purposes as
one example of fair use. See supra note 52. Recently, however, a suit was filed against New
York University over the systematic copying of copyrighted materials for the purpose of
assembling them into course books. Four months later, the University and the plaintiff pub-
lishers agreed on an out-of-court settlement. As part of the settlement, the University prom-
ised to adhere to guidelines restricting continuous, mass, systematic copying. See Publishers
and N.Y.U. Settle Suit On Colleges' Photocopying Rights, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1983, at Al,
col. 2.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 108(i) (1982).
64. See 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. D 20,205 (CCH) (Feb. 1983).
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been in effect for the past five years, would not the aims of the
Copyright Act have been better served? The court was no less
qualified than Congress to see that the problem posed by photo-
copying in libraries was of a different order than that of hand cop-
ying.6 5 Perhaps it should have pushed Congress harder. The out-
come could not have been any worse.
Underlying the photocopying decision is the issue that makes
rapid updating of the copyright laws of capital importance: who
owns information? In years past, information was primarily a by-
product of industrial development. Now, it is a major part of the
economy itself. Indeed, sociologist Daniel Bell believes that infor-
mation is the hallmark of the post-industrial society.6 Although
labor and capital were the central variables of the industrial soci-
ety, information and knowledge are the crucial factors in the post-
industrial age.6
7
65. It is not even clear that hand copying of an entire work would have been considered
acceptable under the fair use doctrine. In his dissent to the majority opinion in Williams &
Wilkins, Chief Judge Cowen noted that he was unable to find any case law holding that the
word "copy" in the Copyright Act would not apply to hand copying. 487 F.2d at 1365
(Cowen, C.J., dissenting). Cowen pointed out the economic and practical differences be-
tween photocopying and hand copying, concluding that the effect of hand copying is mini-
mal and poses no threat to the copyright holder's interests. Photocopying, however, is of a
different magnitude. Id. at 1368.
Economic historian Harold Innis estimates that a scribe in a monastery working six
hours a day could copy only two to four pages in a day. At that rate, it would take a person
about a year to reproduce a copy of the Bible. H. INNIS, EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATIONS 138
(rev. ed. 1972). See generally Breyer, The Uneasy Case For Copyright: A Study of Copy-
right in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REV. 281 (1970) (arguing
as to the necessity for copyright protection .but not in the form of extending the time period
of the protection); Nimmer, Foreword: Two Copyright Cases, to Project, New Technology
and the Law of Copyright: Reprography and Computers, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 931 (1968)
(discussing the further complications that will result from increased technology).
66. Bell, The Social Framework of the Information Society, in THE COMPUTER AGE: A
TWENTY-YEAR VIEW 163 (M. Dertouzos & J. Moses eds. 1979). For a similar view from a
Japanese scholar, see Y. MASUDA, THE INFORMATION SOCIETY AS POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
(1980) and Kielbowicz, Book Review, 5 COM. & L. 79 (1983).
67. Bell, supra note 66, at 168. Bell notes that information is different from the staples
of the industrial society:
Information, or knowledge, even when it is sold, remains with the producer.
It is a "collective good" in that once it has been created, it is by its nature avail-
able to all. In fact, the character of science itself, as a cooperative venture of
knowledge, depends on the open and complete transmission of all new experi-
ments and discoveries to others in the field.
If knowledge is a collective good there is little incentive for any individual
enterprise to pay for the search for such knowledge, unless it can obtain a pro-
prietary advantage, such as a patent or a copyright. But increasingly, patents no
longer guarantee exclusiveness, . . . [and] copyright becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to police when individuals or libraries can Xerox whatever pages they need
for technical journals or books or when individuals and schools can tape music
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Williams & Wilkins involved a particularly critical type of in-
formation-medical studies. Researchers would request copies of
articles from the government's medical libraries. Presumably, re-
searchers were to use this information to guide their own research
for the benefit of public health. The publisher of the journals
within which the copied articles appeared opposed this free flow of
information. It argued that unbridled copying interfered with his
economic rights in the publications. Without the potential of
profit, it and other publishing companies would be less likely to
produce medical research periodicals. The result would be less
medical information available, not more. Chief Judge Cowen, dis-
senting, identified the balance as one between the rights of authors
and publishers, on the one hand, and "the legitimate public need
for rapid dissemination of scientific and technical literature," on
the other.68
Writing about the general problem of exclusivity versus free
exchange of information, Bell poses the question as one of eco-
nomic and political structure: "[Wihat kind of technical-economic
organization is best designed to be efficient, meet consumer (i.e.,
industrial, commercial, financial, scientific, library) use, and re-
main flexible enough to allow for continuing technological
development[?]""
Thus, information has both social and economic value. What
off the air or record television performance ....
Id. at 174 (footnote omitted). This concern with what copyright and patent do for society,
not just for authors and inventors, is the motivation for all legal intellectual property pro-
tection in the United States. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to ad-
vance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.").
In some instances, the Government has consciously chosen to restrict disclosure of in-
ventions-an act counter to the general purpose of the patent law. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1982)
allows the Government to keep secret any invention the publication of which, in the opinion
of the head of the interested government agency, would harm the national security. The
Government's use of this section in the area of cryptography is well-known. A debate be-
tween the director of the National Science Foundation and the National Security Agency
(N.S.A.) resulted in a compromise that allows the N.S.A. to review any requests for National
Science Foundation funding of cryptographic research. The N.S.A. itself now provides
money for related unclassified civilian research. See Burnham, The Silent Power of the
N.S.A., N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 60, 64-67.
68. 487 F.2d at 1385 (Cowen, C.J., dissenting).
69. Bell, supra note 66, at 195; cf. Arrow, The Economics of Information, in THE COM-
PUTER AGE: A TWENTY-YEAR VIEW, 306, 315 (M. Dertouzos & J. Moses eds. 1979) (discussing
importance of designing incentive structures that will motivate optimal information transfer
because the most efficient system is one in which each individual has specialized knowledge
to make specialized decisions).
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has changed is the speed with which this information can be cre-
ated and exchanged. When the monk in the Xerox commercial of
several years ago was able to copy his manuscripts by machine in-
stead of by hand, it really was "a miracle." By now, he is probably
creating concordances on one of the company's computers faster
than the copying machine can reproduce them. Matthew, Mark,
Luke, and John may have no claim against him, but authors and
inventors of more contemporary work are worried about the rapid
reproduction of their intellectual property.
The speed of the new technology creates the need for quick
legal adaptation. Congress has fiddled while computers and copy-
ing machines have churned. The task is not one of striking a new
balance between private and public interests. Rather, it is deter-
mining how new machines fit into the existing balance.
By and large, courts can be more agile in addressing these
questions-if they are willing to act boldly and creatively. By legis-
lating with great specificity in the Copyright Act, Congress reduced
its flexibility. Additionally, courts are hesitant to read the more
generally-worded patent law expansively; instead, they want Con-
gress to make it more specific. As a result, litigants and courts re-
sort to older and more malleable forms of intellectual property
protection, such as an action for misappropriation of trade secrets.
C. State Trade Secret Protection
Unlike the more rigid Patent and Copyright Acts, trade secret
protection is a creature of the common law. It is subject to modifi-
cation by the courts of each state. As a guide, though, section 757
of the Restatement of Torts sets forth the generally accepted ele-
ments.7 0 Liability attaches if one discovers the secret by improper
means or by a breach of confidence. A case of industrial espionage
decided by Judge Irving Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit demon-
70. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) provides:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do
so, is liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him
by the other in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it
was a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that
the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the
other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and
that its disclosure was made to him by mistake.
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strates just how useful the Restatement test for liability concept
can be.7'
In E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher,72 an un-
known party hired the defendants to take aerial photographs of a
DuPont plant under construction. The photographed plant was
designed to produce methanol by a secret and unpatented process.
The photographer defended himself on the grounds that he had
committed no trespass in flying over the plant and had violated no
law in taking a picture of it.
Judge Goldberg disagreed and ruled that Christopher had in
fact attempted to obtain DuPont's secret by improper means. His
decision was based on the balancing of the economic and social fac-
tors involved. "To obtain knowledge of a process without spending
the time and money to discover it independently is improper un-
less the holder discloses it or fails to take reasonable precautions to
ensure its secrecy," Goldberg wrote.73 To require DuPont to cover
its plant during construction would be economically unreasona-
ble.74 Moreover, it would contribute to a decline in the standard of
business morality.75
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Goldberg showed the
strength of the common law method in dealing with new and un-
usual cases. Considering the element of improper means, he wrote:
"Improper" will always be a word of many nuances, determined
by time, place, and circumstances. We therefore need not pro-
claim a catalogue of commercial improprieties. Clearly, however,
one of its commandments does say "thou shall not appropriate a
trade secret through deviousness under circumstances in which
countervailing defenses are not reasonably available. '76
The continued existence of trade secret protection results
from another preemption decision by the Supreme Court. Chief
Justice Burger, the author of the Goldstein opinion,77 also wrote
71. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1015-16. The case was decided under Texas law, and the Texas Supreme
Court had specifically adopted § 757 of the Restatement in Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex.
566, 314 S.W.2d 763 (1958).
74. 431 U.S. at 1016.
75. Id. at 1016-17.
76. Id. at 1017. For a critical appraisal of the economic foundation of the court's deci-
sion, see Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 683, 696 (1980).
77. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
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the opinion in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.78 As in Goldstein,
the Court held that the federal statute-here the patent law-did
not preempt the state protection-in this case, trade secret. 9 The
result allows courts and litigants considerable latitude, but the rea-
soning is less than persuasive.
The purpose of the patent law is to encourage disclosure of
inventions for the benefit of the public." In return, the inventor is
afforded certain economic rights for a definite period of time.8 1 To
the extent that inventors eschew patent protection in favor of
trade secret protection, the public remains deprived of the knowl-
edge. This preference for trade secret protection rather than pat-
ent law protection thus alters the balance sought between public
disclosure and the inventor's economic protection. The inventor
gets both economic advantage and secrecy.
In Kewanee Oil, the issue was whether the plaintiff corpora-
tion could restrain its former employees from disclosing its secret
processes to their new employer. Chief Justice Burger analyzed the
problem by considering three categories of trade secrets: 1) those
the owner believed to be patentable, 2) those the owner knew were
not patentable, and 3) those whose patentability was dubious.82
In the second category, Burger wrote, trade secret protection
is not inconsistent with the patent law because inventors would
not apply for patents they knew they could not obtain, and thus
nothing would be disclosed in either event.83 One wonders, how-
ever, how this finding corresponds with the Court's decisions ten
years earlier in Sears and Compco that a state could not afford
misappropriation protection to an unpatentable item. Recall that
the Court concluded that unpatentable works were free for all to
copy, so long as they did not deceive the public as to their source.8
Addressing the third category next, Burger said that the risk
of a court declaring a patent invalid would deter some inventors
from applying for a patent.8 That being the case, the Chief Justice
said that extended trade secret protection would assist such inven-
tors in exploiting their discoveries. 86 That finding, however, dis-
78. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
79. Id. at 493.
80. See Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945).
81. See Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Clark & Clark, 157 F.2d 725 (1946).
82. 416 U.S. at 484.
83. Id. at 485.
84. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
85. 416 U.S. at 487.
86. Id.
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courages inventors of borderline items from participating in the
patent and disclosure process and, thus, would seem to conflict
with the statutory policy promoting disclosure.
Finally, the Chief Justice dealt with the first and most difficult
category-that of an inventor whose work is clearly patentable. "It
is here," Burger correctly observed, "that the federal interest in
disclosure is at its peak.""7 If a substantial risk existed that these
inventors would opt for state protection rather than federal pat-
ents, he said, "we would be compelled to hold that such a system
could not constitutionally continue to exist."8" Then, however, he
concluded that the risk did not exist, because few inventors would
rely on what was thought to be the weaker protection offered by
trade secret law.89
Chief Justice Burger's prophecy has not proven true-espe-
cially in some areas of computer technology and applications,
where trade secret has come to be the protection of choice.90 The
plethora of recent cases involving accusations of theft of such
secrets, not the least of which involved IBM and a competitor,
bears witness to that fact. 1
The popularity of trade secret protection is due, in part, to its
flexibility. As a common law doctrine, courts can mold it to fit the
circumstances. In contrast, courts often are shy about updating the
copyright and patent law. If that were not the case, inventors
might not avoid the statutory protection, and the public might re-
ceive its quid pro quo of disclosure. Far from interfering with a
"unified" system of intellectual property, the courts might help
achieve that goal. If courts applied the common law method to the
statutes, evasion would be unnecessary. Flexibility would be built
into the system, and the goal of Congress would be better served.
Until that occurs, however, large numbers of inventions are likely
to remain hidden in the netherworld of trade secret.
II. THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
According to Calabresi, a proper role for common law courts is
to decide when a retentionist bias should apply to statutes. Tech-
87. Id. at 489.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 489-90.
90. See infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
91. See generally Gilburne & Johnston, Trade Secret Protection for Software Gener-
ally and in the Mass Market, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 211 (1982) (addressing the scope and efficacy
of trade secret protection).
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nological change, he writes, reduces the rationale for such a bias.2
It creates new problems that the elected branch could not have
addressed. As a result, he says, courts should consider themselves
capable of determining if the old distinctions still apply, and if so,
how the new technology relates to them. Alternatively, the courts
may simply declare that the old law fails to fit and refuse to en-
force it until Congress brings it up to date.
Technological change, obviously, is the central problem in cur-
rent litigation involving intellectual property. Indeed, that would
not surprise Calabresi, for he contends that laws that do not fit the
legal landscape lead to court challenges." The discussion in the
previous section revealed that this is not a new problem. Rather, it
is a dilemma intrinsic to this area of law. Historically, there have
always been new inventions and modes of expression. What has
changed is the speed with which they are occurring now-far faster
than any legislature's ability to keep up.
In this section, I will examine a few of the recent controver-
sies. The technology is diverse, but the cases share an important
attribute: they all are concerned with extending existing distinc-
tions to new inventions, thereby treating like cases alike. The new
technology, however, has received remarkably different treatment
by Congress and the courts.
A. Computers and Computer Programs
The proprietorship of PAC-MAN would hardly seem to be one
of the pressing issues of American society, but in fact the problem
of protecting video games 4 illustrates the more substantial chal-
lenge of protection of all computer software. During the 1982 term,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case pitting PAC-MAN
against a rival, K.C. Munchkin 5 The preliminary injunction
92. G. CALABREsi, supra note 1, at 130-31.
93. Id. at 143. Rapid technological change also is likely to result in crisis lawmaking,
according to Calabresi. Other quick changes, he says, can render them anachronistic. There-
fore, Calabresi contends, these laws deserve very little retentionist bias. Id. at 133.
94. A video game consists of a computer program embedded in a silicon chip called a
read-only memory (ROM) that interacts with a microprocessor to create certain patterns on
a video screen. See generally Kramsky, The Video Game: Our Legal System Grapples with
a Social Phenomenon, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 335, 337-38 (1982) (describing physical struc-
ture and operation of computers). The actions a player takes with the game's controls dur-
ing the play mode affect the video screen patterns. The system itself generates patterns
during the attract mode-the period in which the game is not being played.
95. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
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granted to PAC-MAN declared K.C. Munchkin to be an infringing
copy.
1. PATENT LAW PROTECTION
The PAC-MAN case illustrates the dichotomy between the
treatment of computer programs as intellectual property under the
Copyright Act and under the Patent Law. The PAC-MAN case
was brought as a copyright action. It could not arise under the pat-
ent law, because in 1978 the Supreme Court severely restricted the
availability of patent protection for computer programs."6 In
Parker v. Flook,97 the plaintiff sought protection for a process that
updated alarm limits governing conditions such as temperature,
pressure, and flow rates9" during catalytic conversion. The com-
puter process, for which patent protection was sought, measured
the present value of the variables, employed a mathematical
formula to calculate an updated alarm limit value, and adjusted
the actual alarm limit to the updated value.99
The Flook case turned on the construction of section 101 of
the Patent Law,100 which describes the subject matter that is eligi-
ble for protection. 101 Relying on a previous decision that a mathe-
matical algorithm by itself cannot be patented,1 0 2 the Court held
that an algorithm directed at achieving a particular re-
sult-admittedly a novel and useful formula-was merely "an im-
proved method of calculation" and, therefore, incapable of patent
protection under section 101 of the Act.103
96. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). See generally Moskowitz, The Metamorphosis of Software-
Related Invention Patentability, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 273 (1982) (analyzing Parker v. Flook
and other cases that address limits on patent protection of computer programs and pro-
posed guidelines for drafting and reviewing software-related claims).
97. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
98. Id. at 585.
99. Id.
100. Patent Law, ch. 950, § 101, 66 Stat. 792, 797 (1952) (current version at 35 U.S.C. §
101 (1983)); see supra note 9. Section 100(b) of the Act provides "[tihe term 'process' means
process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material." 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1982).
101. 437 U.S. at 588.
102. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). The patent sought in this case was for a
method of programming a digital computer to convert numerical information from binary-
coded decimal form into pure binary form. Algorithm was defined as "[a] procedure for
solving a given type of mathematical problem." Id. at 65.
103. 437 U.S. at 595 n.18. The algorithm in Flook was distinct from the end product.
The Court described it as simply a new way of calculating alarm limit values. Id. at 594-95.
But cf. In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175 (1981) (rubber curing process in which algorithm was integral part of achieving end
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Underlying the decision in Flook was the essential notion of
intellectual property that one cannot claim exclusive rights over an
idea. A mathematical formula, no matter how elegant, the Court
reasoned, is nothing more than a principle of nature. Thus, despite
the inventiveness of one who harnesses the formula to do a partic-
ular job, it cannot be patented in the absence of an additional in-
ventive concept in its application.' 04
In effect, the appropriate inquiry in Flook was whether a com-
puter program was more like other patentable processes or ideas. It
was an issue of treating like cases alike. Justice Stevens, in his ma-
jority opinion, acknowledged that the issue of the application of
patent protection to computer programs was a new one, but then
he went on to say that he was basing his decision largely on the
fact that other courts (with the notable exception of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, both in this case'0 5 and in the previ-
ous algorithm case'0 6) had not held such programs to be patenta-
ble. How Stevens expected such a determination to be made before
computer programs existed is not clear. Stevens wrote:
To a large extent our conclusion is based on reasoning de-
rived from opinions written before the modern business of de-
veloping programs for computers was conceived. The youth of
the industry may explain the complete absence of precedent
supporting patentability. Neither the dearth of precedent, nor
this decision, should therefore be interpreted as reflecting a
judgment that patent protection of certain novel and useful
computer programs will not promote the progress of science and
the useful arts, or that such protection is undesirable as a mat-
ter of policy. Difficult questions of policy concerning the kinds
of programs that may be appropriate for patent protection and
the form and duration of such protection can be answered by
Congress on the basis of current empirical data not equally
product held patentable).
104. 437 U.S. at 594-95. The Court reasoned that:
[The] process is unpatentable under § 101, not because it contains a mathemati-
cal algorithm as one component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to
be within the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no pat-
entable invention. Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical
formula may be well known, an inventive application of the principle may be
patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a pat-
ent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.
437 U.S. at 594.
105. In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
106. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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available to this tribunal.1 0 7
If anything then, the majority opinion in Flook displayed a
timidity on the part of the Court at becoming involved in the up-
dating of the Patent Law. To be sure, the Court left Congress an
opening, but it hardly forced the issue. It also chose to overrule the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, one of the few judicial insti-
tutions that can claim special expertise in this area.108 This is not
to say that computer programs should or should not be patentable,
only that the Court was no less competent than the Congress to
examine all the evidence and reach a conclusion. The questions of
policy that Justice Stevens spoke of are questions of whether com-
puter programs are like other processes that the Law protects. The
Court did not have to underestimate its ability to determine the
107. 437 U.S. at 595. But see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quot-
ing United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933)), in which the Court
said that courts "should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the
legislature has not expressed."
Commentary on program patentability prior to Flook included Bender, Computer Pro-
grams: Should They Be Patentable?, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 241 (1968); Buckman, Protection of
Proprietory Interest in Computer Programs, 51 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 135 (1969); Comment,
Computer Program Protection: The Need to Legislate a Solution, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 586
(1969).
108. Curiously, the other body with patent expertise, the Patent and Trademark Office,
was also against the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' decision in both cases. The
Patent and Trademark Commissioner's objection, however, appeared to have been more
concerned with expedience than with patentability. The Commissioner's petition for a writ
of certiorari argued that a decision in favor of patentability in Flook would require him to
process thousands of additional patent applications. 437 U.S. at 587-88. Similarly, in Ben-
son, the Court deferred to the policy determination of the President's Commission on the
Patent System that computer programs should not be patented, in part because of the Com-
mission's finding that:
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs because of
a lack of a classification technique and the requisite search files. Even if these
were available, reliable searches would not be feasible or economic because of
the tremendous volume of prior art being generated. Without this search, the
patenting of programs would be tantamount to mere registration and the pre-
sumption of validity would be all but nonexistent.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, "To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF ... USE-
FUL ARTS" 13 (1966) (quoted in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972)).
The Patent and Trademark Commissioner's objection underscores Calabresi's conten-
tion that administrative agencies respond to their staff's view of the problem rather than
society's view. G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 52-54. Therefore, the courts should not casu-
ally accept an agency's judgment on such matters. Rather, they, too, should be receptive to
judicial updating in instances in which they lag behind technological change or are inconsis-
tent with other parts of the legal landscape. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
however, had the expertise that is the hallmark of an agency, without many of the constric-
tions that bind the Patent and Trademark Office. Because this court combines judicial at-
tention to principles with agency knowledge of the practical application of those principles,
the Supreme Court should have given considerable weight to its views.
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answers to such questions.
For whatever reason, Congress has not revised the Patent Law
to include computer programs. Consequently, Congress has forced
those who devise such programs to look elsewhere for protection.
The Copyright Act and trade secret law provide their principal
havens.
2. COPYRIGHT ACT PROTECTION
New technology has given rise to an even more subtle question
where copyright in a computer program is sought: are programs
embedded in silicon chips intelligible to humans? Beginning in
1964, the Copyright Office accepted any program for registration
that was eye-readable and intelligible to humans, in addition to
satisfying the other eligibility requirements.109 Congress did not
explicitly authorize the practice, but the Office apparently con-
cluded that consistency within the Copyright Act called for it to
treat the programs like other "literary works."110
In the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Congress implicitly val-
idated the Office's registration practice. The Act specifically men-
tioned those media forms in which programs are commonly written
as acceptable for fixation.111 Apparently, the legislators concluded
that no reason external to the statute demanded that they treat
such works like other literary works. Additionally, the 1976 Act
eliminated the requirement of eye-readability. 2
In Stern Electronics v. Kaufman,1"3 a video game case, the
Eastern District of New York did not reach that issue, holding in-
stead that unauthorized copying of the ROM-embedded program
infringed the copyright in the audiovisual display.1" Although the
109. See Boorstyn, Copyrights, Computers, and Confusion, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 276
(1981).
110. Id.; see G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 54.
111. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) provides in part:
"Literary works" are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of
the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, pho-
norecords, film, tape, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied.
112. The requirement was set forth in White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209
U.S. 1 (1908). See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text. See generally Boorstyn, supra
note 109, at 277 (discussing the eligibility requirements for copyright protection).
113. 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
114. The court compared a video game to a motion picture and, thus, afforded the dis-
play protection as an audiovisual work. "An audiovisual display is an appropriate subject for
a copyright," the court said, "even if the underlying computer program is not copyrighted."
Id. at 639. The plaintiff in Stern had registered a videotape of the display but not the
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display is important in a video game, it is almost inconsequential
in many computer programs. Where the audiovisual display is in-
significant the courts have been unable to avoid the issue of
whether the program itself is intelligible to humans and therefore
subject to copyright protection.
The most that can be said at the moment is that the common
law method is at work. Most courts have held that because the
software contained within a ROM "can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated . . . with the aid of a machine or de-
vice," the language of the statute protects it against unauthorized
copying.115
Any attempt to resolve these cases depends on a court's ability
to understand the technology involved. Some may argue that this
fact emphasizes the need for a legislative determination, but con-
gressmen do not have more expertise in matters of computer chips
than judges. Congress would hold committee hearings, at which ex-
perts would offer testimony on the subject. Courts would rely on
litigants to bring forth the experts. In either case, the experts are
heard. What is at issue is whether an embedded program is like a
literary work fixed in a media form that is already deemed pro-
tected under the statute-a question of treating like cases alike.
The contents of a computer program, as fixed in a ROM, con-
sist of a source code and an object code. The source code, roughly
speaking, is the language used to translate human commands into
statements the machine can understand. It can be called forth in
an intelligible form by a "PRINT" command, and thus filed for
registration with the Copyright Office. 1 6 The object code, however,
is ephemeral. It is the part of the program that interacts with the
program itself. Id. at 638.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982); see, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725
F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240
(3d Cir. 1983), writ dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc.,
685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (N.D. Cal.
1982); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
See generally Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1723 (1983) (arguing that copyright law should protect object code).
116. See Stern, Another Look at Copyright Protection of Software: Did the 1980 Act
Do Anything For Object Code?, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 1, 10-11 (1981). The Computer Software
Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, amended section 117 of the Copy-
right Revision Act of 1976 to allow users to make archival copies of the programs they
purchase and also added a definition of computer program to section 101: "A 'computer
program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer
in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The Act resulted from
congressional consideration of the recommendations of the Commission on New Technologi-
cal Uses (CONTU). See Stern, supra, at 8-13.
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data entered to produce output. As a result, it varies with each
computer run. In form, it is nothing more than a series of "Os" and
"ls", intelligible not even to computer experts.117
In Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.'1 1 8 the
Northern District of Illinois ruled that an object code embedded in
a ROM performs a mechanical function and nothing more. Thus, it
is not susceptible to copyright protection. The Northern District of
California in GCA Corp. v. Chance has held to the contrary, rea-
soning that the object code is the encryption of the copyrighted
source code and that, as a result, both codes should be treated as
one copyrighted work. 9 Perhaps this disagreement points to a
need for Congress to provide an authoritative decision. Yet, the
same could be said of any question resolved by the common law
method. The weakness of the common law method-incremental-
ism-is its strength. Moreover, by the time Congress studies the
issue, holds hearings, and passes legislation, its timetable may turn
out to be just as slow.
a. Overlap with State Trade Secret Protection
Because of all the confusion surrounding copyright of com-
puter software, manufacturers have resorted to the trade secret ap-
proach. Although it is a creature of the common law, it is the most
reliable mode of protection at the moment. Some software compa-
nies, however, have not been content to elect a theory. Instead,
they have attempted to keep their secret and obtain their copy-
right, too-a state of affairs that has generated serious preemption
questions, about which authorities also are divided.120 Put simply,
117. Stern, supra note 116, at 3, 10-11. Stern defined "object code" as: "[the] mechani-
cal counterpart of a source program. Object code is directly usable in a machine, and is not
written at all (in the ordinary sense of that word), but is embodied in magnetic tape, disks,
or other physical device, such as a read-only memory (ROM)." Id. at 2.
118. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.
1980).
119. 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718, 720 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
120. Compare M. Bryce & Assocs. v. Gladstone, [1981-1983] COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
D 25,418 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1982) (affixing copyright notice did not preempt trade
secret), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 258 (1982) with Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., 676
F.2d 494 (11th Cir.) (trade secret is equivalent to copyright claim and thus is preempted),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 450 (1982). Commentators also are divided on the issue. Compare
Does the Copyright Act Preempt Trade Secrets?, COMPUTER L. & TAx REP. 5, 7 (July 1981)
(software algorithm not copyrightable, thus trade secret is not equivalent claim and the
1976 Copyright Act does not preempt it) with Luccarelli, The Supremacy of Federal Copy-
right Law Over State Trade Secret Law for Copyrightable Computer Programs Marked
With a Copyright Notice, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 19, 43-51 (1981) (simultaneous use of trade se-
cret and copyright protection not possible).
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the question is whether one can obtain the benefits of the Copy-
right Act without bearing its burdens of disclosure.
The answer turns on interpretation of section 301 of the 1976
Act. 21 As was discussed earlier, the legislative history of the Act is
not clear as to the extent to which it preempts state copyright law,
including state trade secret protection. 12 2 It is one thing to rely on
trade secret law instead of applying for a copyright. It is something
else to try to have each fill the gaps left by the other. The former
raises questions of equivalence; the latter-equivalence and failure
to maintain secrecy. The second issue undoubtedly is the more dif-
ficult-requiring a balancing of the public's interest in disclosure
and the author's desire for legal flexibility.
Warrington Associates, Inc. v. Real-Time Engineering Sys-
tems, Inc. 23 illustrates the dilemma. The plaintiff in this case reg-
istered the user's manual to his computer program with the Copy-
right Office; however, it still claimed that it contained trade
secrets. The plaintiff licensed the program to a bank for use in
business. The Northern District of Illinois held that the Copyright
Act did not preempt state trade secret protection, because trade
secret protects mere ideas-something beyond the scope of the
Act. The dual claim, however, raised the more perplexing issue: by
licensing the computer program for use in business and filing the
program with the Copyright Office, had the plaintiff not disclosed
his secret? If so, his trade secret claim self-destructs. 24
To counteract this contention, software manufacturers com-
monly license their programs subject to secrecy agreements. In-
deed, that was the case in the related action of Warrington Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Kellogg Citizens National Bank. 23 A former vice-
121. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
122. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
123. 522 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Il. 1981).
124. In order to preserve a trade secret cause of action, one must take reasonable steps
to preserve his secret. The economic basis of this principle is discussed in Kitch, supra note
76, at 699. Luccarelli set forth the weaknesses of trade secret protection:
First, disclosure agreements may be unenforceable after the secret becomes part
of the general public knowledge unless contractual terms explicitly provide for
enforcement after public dissemination. Second, the trade secret owner cannot
maintain a misappropriation of trade secret cause of action against members of
the general public who use the secret once it enters the public domain.
Luccarelli, supra note 120, at 44 (footnotes omitted). Luccarelli noted that once an owner
registers and deposits the work for federal copyright protection, it no longer remains a se-
cret, and the ideas contained therein are not afforded trade secret protection. Id. at 46.
125. 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 375 (E.D. Wis., Dec. 3, 1981). See generally Are Nondisclo-
sure Agreements in Restraint of Trade?, COMPUTER L. & TAX. REP. 1, 1 (Mar. 1982).
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president of the bank had disclosed the contents of the manual to
Real-Time, the defendants in the other action. The defendants
raised the argument that the secrecy agreement between Warring-
ton Associates, Inc. and Kellogg Citizens National Bank violated
public policy. The Eastern District of Wisconsin ruled that it did
not; instead, it was merely a promise between noncompeting par-
ties not to disclose confidential information. 2
The Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section of the Ameri-
can Bar Association has been no more consistent on this preemp-
tion question than the courts. In 1980, its Trade Secrets and Inter-
ference with Contracts Committee concluded that no conflict
existed in placing a copyright notice on material to which trade
secret protection also was afforded. 127 The next year, the successor
to the 1980 committee reported that "the conflicting nature of
trade secret and copyright theories seems to negate a conclusion
that they may be relied on automatically and simultaneously."' 28
If the Copyright Act provided complete protection to authors
of computer software, reliance on trade secret protection would be
unnecessary. Copyright lasts for fifty years beyond the death of the
author12 or, in the case of works made for hire, seventy-five years
from the first publication or 100 years from the year of creation,
whichever comes first.130 Although trade secret protection can per-
sist indefinitely, the statutory duration of copyright protection is
much longer than the period during which the program would be
valuable. In fact, even the shorter patent exclusivity period of sev-
enteen years would be more than adequate.' 3' The problem, of
course, is that neither statute is as comprehensive as common law
trade secret protection. Until that changes, resort to the common
law is inevitable.
Even with legal remedies, software manufacturers have been
forced to rely on other means of protecting their product. A com-
puter program, especially one written onto a disk, is just too easy
126. 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 379.
127. Trade Secrets & Interference with Contracts Comm. of A.B.A. Sec. Pat., Trade-
mark & Copyright, 1980 COMMITTEE REPORT 218-19.
128. Trade Secrets & Interference with Contracts Comm. of A.B.A. Sec. Pat., Trade-
mark & Copyright, 1981 COMMITTEE REPORTS 91, 93. The reports are discussed in Luccarelli,
supra note 120, at 20. Legislation introduced in Congress would have amended § 301 of the
Copyright Act to declare that the Act does not preempt state trade secret protection as to
nonequivalent rights. H.R. 6983, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1982).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982).
130. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1982).
131. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
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to copy.1 32 Computer programs are the record piracy problem of
the 1980's. Some companies have built anti-copying features into
their programs.1 33 This, however, interferes with the ability of a
legal purchaser to make a backup copy.'" One suggested solution
is to embed the program in a chip, but that raises the additional
copyright problems discussed above. Nevertheless, perhaps the
most promising approach is that for which patent approval re-
cently was granted: a ROM chip that will execute a program but
not disclose its structure.'35 Copying still is possible, but it is much
more difficult.1 36
The primary point of this discussion is that when Congress
fails to respond to new technology quickly and completely, authors
and inventors are driven toward old modes of common law protec-
tion. These older forms can keep up with technology when statutes
cannot because the common law is general enough to afford flexi-
bility. Instead of defining the precise metes and bounds of the
field, trade secret law, for example, describes the lay of the land.
Armed with that general description, courts can consider whether a
new technology should be fenced in or out of the protective scope
of trade secret law. The more specific a legislature is in responding
to a particular situation, the more problems it creates for subse-
quent innovations.
b. Copyright Protection for Video Games
To bring the discussion full circle, the copyrightability of a
video game is itself a question of considering the applicability of
precedent to new technology. In addition to the underlying copy-
right issues applicable to all computer software, there is the ques-
tion of whether the game itself can be protected. A game is nothing
more than an idea, and an idea cannot be co-opted. Is PAC-MAN
merely a maze game and therefore not entitled to copyright?
The Atari case resolved that issue-affording copyright pro-
tection not to the concept of the game but rather to its characters.
In overruling the Northern District of Illinois, the Seventh Circuit
wrote that "[tihe expression of the central figure as a 'gobbler' and
the pursuit figures as 'ghost monsters' distinguishes PAC-MAN
132. See Piracy in Era of Computers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1983, at D2, col. 1.
133. See Battling the Computer Pirates, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1983, at D1, col. 3.
134. Id. at D7.
135. See supra note 132.
136. Id.
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from conceptually similar video games. 131 K.C. Munchkin in-
fringed because it copied the characters, not the game.
In so holding, the appellate court disagreed with the district
court's learned explication of the difference in the games' charac-
ters. 13  The district court described the distinctive features as
follows:
In "K.C. Munchkin," the central character, the munchkin, ap-
pears as a blue figure with horns, normally with a smile, but
when he is attacked by a monster, his smile turns to a frown;
and then he evaporates upwardly from the screen. The charac-
ter, or the appearance of the central figure, is that he initially
faces the viewer rather than showing a profile. As he moves
along the maze he shows a profile, and when he stops, he turns
around to face the viewer with another smile. Thus the central
character is made to have a personality which the central char-
acter in "Pac-Man" does not have. "K.C. Munchkin" has
munchers which are much "spookier" than the goblins in "Pac-
Man". Their legs are longer and move more dramatically; their
eyes are vacant, all of these features being absent in "Pac-
Man. "139
In terms of social importance, the spookiness content of PAC-
MAN and K.C. Munchkin may not mean much, but the institu-
tional ability of courts to resolve the underlying questions is of no
small moment. Congress has shown no great distinction in either
anticipating new technology or responding to it. As a result,
greater judicial activism would provide some current in what oth-
erwise has commonly been a vacuum. A judicial determination
would be only the starting point of the process. Congress could leg-
islate if it did not like the result. The argument is that courts are
better able to respond quickly to innovation than the legislature,
not that the legislature should not respond at all.
c. Copyright Protection for Computer Technology
In the area of computer technology, new questions concerning
copyright are destined to arise rapidly. The late Ithiel de Sola
Pool, a professor at MIT, has provided several examples.140 One
137. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
138. Id. at 617-18.
139. Kramsky, supra note 94, at 349 (quoting No. 81-C-6434, slip op. at 7-8 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 4, 1981)).
140. See Pool, The Culture of Electronic Print, DAEDALUS, Fall 1982 at 17, 27-28.
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concerns evolutionary manuscripts. Under current law, copyright
attaches as soon as the writing is fixed. Pool, however, suggests
that some manuscripts may not exist in a canonical version."'
That is, they may be written; other people may be allowed to view
them on their computer terminals and even asked to edit them;
and students may be encouraged to interact with them. 42 At what
stage is the manuscript fixed? Is each version fixed much like sev-
eral drafts of a paper? If so, which is the final official draft? This is
important, for if infringement is alleged, the plaintiff must show
substantial similarity between his work and the alleged infringing
work-presumably similarity at the time the defendant wrote his
work or when he had access to it. When the document is constantly
evolving, it may be impossible to prove its state at any given point.
Another of Pool's examples is the step beyond photocopying:
access to computer data bases. In order to read a work on line, one
must write it on his terminal. That is, he must call it up from the
computer's memory and place it on his terminal screen or print it
out. 4" Is that more akin to copying the material or merely reading
it in a library?
Pool predicts that "[tiotally new concepts will have to be in-
vented to compensate creative work. The notion of copyright based
on print simply won't work."" 4 In a similar vein, one notewriter
141. Id. at 27.
142. Id. at 27-28.
143. Id. at 28-29. Members of the Newsletter Association of America considered suing
the New York Times over its abstracting of their copyrighted newsletters for the Times'
computerized data bank. The owner of Energy Daily said he discovered the practice when
one of his subscribers failed to renew. Upon calling the subscriber, he was told that the
company could get all the information it needed from the Times Information Service. See
NYTIS and Newsletter Publishers In Copyright Imbroglio, 3 ONLINE DATABASE REPORT 1
(Mar. 1982).
Preparing derivative works is one of the exclusive rights under § 106 of the Copyright
Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982). The fair use exception, § 107, might be thought to justify
the abstraction of copyrighted articles; however, the use of computer technology to make the
abstracts a substitute for the actual publication makes the fair use defense less valid. One of
the factors a court is to consider in determining fair use is "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982).
144. Pool, supra note 140, at 29; cf. Kurz, Addressing the Reprographic Revolution:
Compensating Copyright Owners for Mass Infringement, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 261, 264-81
(1982) (Courts should not apply old law to new problems; instead, Congress should create a
taxing scheme to compensate authors.). Pool's concern extends beyond copyright. He be-
lieves that as the boundaries between different media blur-as newspapers are delivered
electronically, for example-the regulatory distinctions also blur. As a result, Pool worries
that previously unregulated printed messages may become subject to some government con-
trol when they are transmitted electronically. This evolution is the subject of his latest book.
I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983); see Rosen, Book Review, 18 U.S.F.L. REv. 405
(1984).
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recently suggested that a "unified theory of copyright infringement
for an advanced technological era" be constructed, distinguishing
between commercial and noncommercial use and between "itera-
tive" and "interactive" activities." 5 In his new system, only itera-
tive commercial uses would infringe the copyright. 46
Under the latter scheme, the copying of a "book" on line for
private use would give rise to no copyright liability because the
user received no "direct pecuniary benefit."" 47 Similarly, under
Pool's thinking, such abuse would be free of liability under existing
law because it is "analogous to word-of-mouth communication in
the eighteenth century [which was not subject to copyright], not to
the print shop of that time [which was].""148 Thus, Pool says, there
arises the need for a totally new system. 49
Both authors ignore the power of the common law. Courts do
not need new concepts of intellectual property. They need to fit
new technology into existing concepts. The system of affording
limited protection to creative people is not outdated. Only the
statutory specifications of the system are behind the times. The
most effective means of responding to changed conditions is com-
mon law updating, not wholesale legislative revision.
The notewriter's solution illustrates the danger of looking for
new concepts because of the existence of new technology. As more
and more people obtain access to computer terminals and data ba-
ses, fewer and fewer have any incentive to purchase a "book" if
they can obtain it on line free of charge, or for a nominal fee pur-
suant to a contract between the author and the data base repub-
lisher. A common law court could reason that a computer data
base is not like a library. The number of copies the library buys
limits the number of persons who can borrow a book from a library
at any time. In contrast, the number of people who can obtain cop-
ies by tapping a data base is unlimited, and the base buys only one
copy. This is the Xerox machine writ large.
Potential diminution in sales, the notewriter says, likely would
occur, but that, he contends, "is not where the infringement in-
145. Note, Toward a Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement for an Advanced
Technological Era, 96 HARv. L. REv. 450, 462-63 (1982). The note defines "iterative" as
copying "for the purpose of simply reasserting. . . the contents of the original." Id. at 462.
"Interactive derivation results in a modification of the original . . . for such purposes as
scholarly criticism, parody, or research." Id.
146. Id. at 463.
147. Id.
148. Pool, supra note 140, at 28.
149. Id. at 29.
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quiry ought to lie."'' 0 Instead, he wants to focus on commercial
use.' 5 ' That theory fails to take account of the way new technology
changes the marketplace. A reader of a book may not obtain pecu-
niary value from it, but if everyone reads the book without paying,
the author has no economic incentive to write it. As a result, the
underlying basis of the copyright clause of the Constitution is
displaced.
Interaction with media is nothing new. Any communication in-
volves both sending and receiving. The question is whether the in-
teraction with a computer data base is like the interaction with
older technology for which the legal balance has been struck. We
may indulge ourselves in believing that the nature of the problem
has changed, but in fact only the manifestations and the speed
with which they occur have changed. That being the case, what is
needed is not more statutes but rather more logical reasoning from
accepted principles.
d. Copyright Protection for Artificial Intelligence
Having said that, there is one hard case that may in fact pre-
sent a new problem-that of "artificial intelligence."' 2 Artificial
intelligence is the step beyond machines programmed to carry out
human instruction. Instead, the machines make their own deci-
sions within a constellation defined by the programmer. Pool says
that "[tihe idea that a machine is capable of intellectual labor is
beyond the scope of the copyright statute." '53 That may be true.
At the very least it is a hard case.
The recent activity of an artist named Harold Cohen
manifests this new challenge. Cohen has ceased drawing. Instead,
150. Note, supra note 145, at 465. But see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (specifically identify-
ing diminution of market as a factor in fair use analysis). The notewriter contends that this
economic component offers no guidance as to new technology because of the difficulty of
identifying infringers. Note, supra note 145, at 467. Indeed, it is difficult to find every per-
son who makes a videotape of a copyrighted television program or prints out a copy of an
abstract of a copyrighted article. Ease of ascertainment, however, is an administrative prob-
lem related to the fashioning of a remedy not to the right itself. If anything, the difficulty of
detection points toward the creation of a compulsory licensing system, with a percentage of
the sales price of tapes and disks and perhaps subscriptions to data bases, going to the
copyright owners.
151. Note, supra note 145, at 465.
152. See generally Denicoff, Sophisticated Software: The Road to Science and Utopia,
in THE COMPUTER AGE: A TWENTY-YEAR VIEW 375-80 (M. Dertouzos & J. Moses eds. 1979)
(discussing the 15-year history of artificial intelligence).
153. Pool, supra note 140, at 29.
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he spends his time programming a personal computer to draw."5 4
Unlike most computer artists, Cohen does not program the ma-
chine to achieve a particular result. Rather, he instructs it in vari-
ous concepts of art: rules of space, positioning, and draftsman-
ship.155 Then, he allows it to create its own compositions, a task it
performs at the rate of twelve drawings per hour.'
Using existing ideas and processes to create art works, the
computer is like a student. As a result, its teacher has no copyright
claim to its work. The machine, however, has no rights itself either.
Arguably, the work is in the public domain. Yet, that would leave
otherwise copyrightable "intellectual" creations without
protection.
On the other hand, one might say that the computer is only
the artist's brush-the means he uses to create. Thus, its output
would be copyrightable in the name of the artist. This, however,
seems to minimize the independence of machine from man. Per-
haps artificial intelligence is one area in which a decision about
protection may be cut from whole cloth, yet the very novelty of the
problem serves to prove the principal hypothesis here: the remain-
ing issues involve only new ways of expressing human intelligence
and, as such, courts may resolve them by fitting them within the
legal landscape.
Difficulty notwithstanding, a court faced with such a case
would have to make a decision. A commentator should do no less.
The starting point is the statute itself. Section 102 of the Copy-
right Act extends protection to "pictorial works," as distinguished
from the procedure for creating those works. Accordingly, the fact
that Cohen uses a machine as part of the process to create art
would seem to be irrelevant. It is the work itself, fixed in a tangible
medium of expression, that is covered.
The question of originality and authorship is analogous to that
raised in Burrow-Giles 1-57-whether a photographer is properly
considered the author of a photograph. There, the court ruled that
154. See Portrait of the Artist As a Young Computer, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1983, at
H31, col. 1.
155. Id.
156. Id. The less problematic form of computer art, in which the programmer/artist
instructs the machine to produce a particular result, is discussed in Negroponte, The Return
of the Sunday Painter, in THE COMPUTER AGE: A TWENTY-YEAR VIEw 21 (M. Dertouzos & J.
Moses eds. 1979). For a general discussion of artificial intelligence, see Minsky, Computer
Science and the Representation of Knowledge, in THE COMPUTER AGE: A TWENTY-YEAR
ViEw 392 (M. Dertouzos & J. Moses eds. 1979).
157. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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the posing of the subject, the arranging of the scenery, and the
lighting showed the picture "to be an original work of art, the
product of plaintiff's intellectual invention, of which the plaintiff is
the author.' 5 8
The key phrase is "intellectual invention," and the key issue,
as characterized in Burrow-Giles, is whether the work "owe[s] its
origin" to the "author.' 1 59 Viewed in that light, Harold Cohen and
other artificial intelligence programmers are indeed the authors of
their computers' works.'10 Although the machines make decisions
on their own, those decisions are made within confines established
by the programmer/artist. A programmer who wanted different
types of pictures would provide different rules of drawing to his
computer. Thus, while it is true that Cohen, unlike a photographer,
does not anticipate the precise appearance of the final product, he
contributes that without which the endproduct would not exist at
all.
Yet, one does not need a computer to allow forces beyond his
control to contribute to this art. Reliance on chance is sufficient.
John Cage has composed music in that manner, relying on the ran-
dom patterns of the I Ching, the Chinese Book of Changes, to
make musical decisions.' Other composers have "written" music
that allows orchestra members to decide what and when to play.
62
The decisions to allow chance to decide is itself an artistic deci-
sion-one that is no less deserving of copyright protection in prin-
ciple or in conformity with the Act. 
1 3
B. Cable Television
The history of cable television's copyright liability is largely a
158. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60.
159. Id. at 57-58.
160. The Copyright Act does not require the actual creator of the work to be the copy-
right holder. To the contrary, § 201(b) establishes the employer as the copyright holder of
works "made for hire" by employees, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in
writing. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982). But see Note, Can a Computer be an Author? Copyright
Aspects of Artificial Intelligence, 4 CoMM/ENT L.J. 707, 744-45 (1982).
161. See generally J. CAGE, SILENCE 57-61 (1961). Other composers have relied on ran-
dom numbers and even telephone directories for the arrangement of their compositions. See
M. NYMAN, EXPERIMENTAL Music 5 (1974).
162. Frederick Rzewski, in his 1969 composition Les Moutons de Panurge, encouraged
performers who had become lost playing the music to remain lost. M. NYMAN, supra note
161, at 5. Morton Feldman, in the 1957 Piece for Four Pianos, directed the performers to
move through suggested material at their own speed. Id.
163. This would not prevent others from employing chance and, perhaps, reaching the
same result. Rather, it would only prohibit the direct copying of the first work.
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tale of two agencies: the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT). The FCC often
acts like a captive of the primary object of its regulation-the
broadcast media. Between these two agencies, the Court and Con-
gress have engaged in an ongoing dialogue that has resulted in
haphazard and often inexplicable results in this area.
Cable originated as a means of obtaining television signals in
remote areas. A single large antenna received otherwise hard-to-get
broadcasts, and a cable linked individual homes to the antenna.
Thus, cable television was designated Community Antenna Televi-
sion or CATV.' 64
Before long, entrepreneurs realized that people in urban areas
would pay to receive additional channels of television. Because
broadcast frequencies are scarce, most communities had no more
than five channels.' 65 Cable systems could import signals from dis-
tant cities to provide additional viewing choices as well as other
specialized services.
1. THE COURT AND THE FCC
Until 1962, the FCC took a laissez-faire attitude toward
CATV. Beginning in that year, however, the Commission began to
regulate the fledgling industry primarily because of pressure from
airwave broadcasters to minimize any competition. In 1966, the
Commission banned the importation of distant signals into the top
100 broadcasting markets. 66 By and large, the Supreme Court up-
held the Commission's restrictions despite the fact that cable held
the promise of providing the diversity that local broadcasting
never could achieve.16 7
Despite the rules, CATV continued to exist, albeit in a re-
tarded form. Some distant signal importation went on under a
grandfather clause, while other systems continued to perform the
original function of CATV-retransmitting the signals of nearby
164. For a brief history of the development and early regulation of cable television, see
STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., CABLE TELEVISION: PROMISE VERSUS REGULATORY
PERFORMANCE (Subcomm. Print Jan. 1976).
165. See generally R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION
REGULATION (1973) (examining the effect of government regulatory policies on performance
of television industry).
166. Second Report and Order in Docket Nos. 14895, 15233, & 15971, 2 F.C.C.2d 725,
782-84 (1966).
167. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
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but hard-to-receive stations. One such system was the defendant in
the lawsuit that established the scope of cable television's copy-
right liability.
In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. ' 68 the
holder of copyrights in several motion pictures claimed that the
CATV systems in Clarksburg and Fairmont, West Virginia, had in-
fringed its copyrights by retransmitting films broadcast by and li-
censed to five television stations. Congress had not legislated on
the copyright liability of cable systems. In fact, the Court observed
that Congress had not revised the Copyright Act since 1909 even
though Congress authorized a study of its deficiencies in 1955.69
Justice Stewart wrote for the majority:
[O]ur inquiry cannot be limited to ordinary meaning and legisla-
tive history, for this is a statute that was drafted long before the
development of the electronic phenomena with which we deal
here. In 1909 radio itself was in its infancy, and television had
not been invented. We must read the statutory language of 60
years ago in the light of drastic technological change. 70
Thus, if the law was to be updated quickly, the Court was go-
ing to have to do it. The Court instead preferred to attempt to
create an untenable situation that would force Congress to act.'7'
Congress, however, did not act for another eight years, finally pass-
ing the 1976 Copyright Act that became effective in 1978.
In Fortnightly, the majority sought to determine if a cable
system was "perform[ing]" the copyrighted work within the mean-
ing of the 1909 Act. 72 The question was whether a cable system is
more like a broadcaster or a viewer. "Broadcasters perform. View-
ers do not perform.' 73 The Court's conclusion: it is more like a
viewer, for it only enhances a viewer's ability to receive a signal by
providing a well-located antenna. 74
In so holding, the Court discounted other important evidence
in making the comparison-specifically, the facts that cable televi-
sion was a business and that cable systems were reaping economic
benefit from the copyrighted programs. Undoubtedly, it was lauda-
ble to make these signals available to the subscribers, but social
168. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
169. Id. at 396 n.17.
170. Id. at 395-96 (footnotes omitted).
171. Id. at 401-02.
172. Id. at 395.
173. Id. at 398 (footnote omitted).
174. Id. at 399.
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utility does not immunize one from copyright liability. If that were
so, Barnes and Noble could send bootlegged copies of bestsellers to
people in small towns without bookstores. In attempting to treat
like cases alike, the Court looked for consistency only within the
statute and failed to consider the external context.
The Court was not without alternatives. The Solicitor General
suggested in an amicus brief that the Justices fashion a compro-
mise solution.'7 5 Under this approach, cable systems would be said
to perform the programs they carry, but a license would be implied
for the carrying of certain signals.77 The majority rejected this al-
ternative, choosing instead to put the onus on Congress to update
the law.
Justice Fortas would not have been so timid. He recognized
the difficulty of fitting cable television into an act written before
television was invented, but he realized that Congress was not pre-
pared to contemporize the 1909 Act. If updating was to occur in a
timely fashion, he concluded, the Court would have to do it, and
not by resorting to a tortured interpretation:
The novelty of the use, incident to the novelty of the new tech-
nology, results in a baffling problem. Applying the normal juris-
prudential tools-the words of the Act, legislative history, and
precedent-to the facts of the case is like trying to repair a tele-
vision set with a mallet. And no aid may be derived from the
recent attempts of Congress to formulate special copyright rules
for CATV-for Congress has vacillated in its approach.177
Fortas presciently observed that "it would be hazardous to as-
sume that Congress will act promptly, comprehensively, and retro-
actively.'1 7 8 Recognizing the important legal issue and economic
values at stake, he examined the factual context in which CATV
operated and rejected the determination of the majority that
CATV equipment performed a function like that of equipment
generally furnished by a television viewer. 7 9 A CATV antenna was
not like a home antenna. A home antenna could not pick up these
signals. CATV carried the programs beyond the range they would
normally reach. Thus, it "perform[ed]" the material that it picked
up and carried, making it functionally distinct from a passive
175. Id. at 401.
176. Id. at 401 n.32. This is similar to the proposal advanced in the home videotaping
case. See infra notes 217-72 and accompanying text.
177. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 403 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
178. Id. at 404.
179. Id. at 405-07.
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receiver.8 0
Fortas would have held that a cable system does perform the
programs it transmits. Rather than casting off precedent without a
compelling reason, he believed that Congress should implement
any necessary changes. "Our ax," he said, "being a rule of law,
must cut straight, sharp, and deep; and perhaps this is a situation
that calls for the compromise of theory and for the architectural
improvisation which only legislation can accomplish."''
In 1972, the FCC once again entered the picture. After the
White House Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) negoti-
ated an agreement among the broadcasters, cable operators, and
copyright holders, the Commission embedded the consensus in its
Cable Television Report and Order. 82 The rules kept importation
of distant signals on a tight rein.5 3
Dissenting in part from the Report, Commissioner Nicholas
Johnson revealed how the rules resulted not from an independent
analysis by an expert regulatory agency but rather from a captive
agency tethered to the industry it is supposed to control:
In future years, when students of law or government wish to
180. Id. at 407. Fortas compared the cable television system to the wired hotel room
system at issue in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 238 U.S. 191 (1931). In that case, the
Court held that a hotel "performed" works of music broadcast by a radio station when the
hotel picked up the signal with a central receiver and passed it along by wire to each of the
rooms. The analogy nicely illustrates the common law method because the Jewell Court
made its decision by comparing the wired radio system to the engagement of an orchestra
for the entertainment of the hotel's guests. The parallel becomes even more striking when
one notices a footnote in the Jewell opinion stating that "[a]t the present time there are
renewed proposals for the revision of the Copyright Act in the light of new conditions." Id.
at 201 n.10. Just as cable television was new to 1960's society, wired radio reception was new
in the 1930's. Nevertheless, the legal questions involving the new technology were nothing
more than determining how it fit within existing value choices-a matter of treating like
cases alike. The majority in Fortnightly, however, ignored the parallel, limiting Jewel to its
facts without a persuasive reason for doing so. 392 U.S. at 396 n.18.
In 1976, Congress made certain secondary transmissions of a primary transmission em-
bodying a performance, such as the transmission involved in Jewell, exempt from copyright
infringement liability. 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (1982). Without commenting on the merits of
the policy, one is struck by the silliness of enacting a hotel radio reception law. If every
medium had its own section of the Copyright Act, the statute would take on elephantine
proportions, thus forcing Congress to amend it several times a year. A more useful approach
would be to prescribe the policy choices in general terms and allow the courts to keep the
act up to date with technology.
181. 392 U.S. at 408 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
182. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
183. Among the most important features were restrictions on the number of distant
signals a cable system could import, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(b)-(e), 76.61(b)-(f), & 76.63 (1980)
(repealed), and the cablecasting of programs to which local television stations had secured
exclusive exhibition rights, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151-.159 (1980) (repealed).
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study the decision making process at its worst, when they look
for examples of industry domination of government, when they
look for Presidential interference in the operation of an agency
responsible to Congress, they will look to the FCC handling of
the never-ending saga of cable television as a classic case
study. 8 4
According to Commissioner Johnson, the intransigence of the
various interested parties during the post-Fortnightly period pre-
vented Congress from resolving the problem of distant signal im-
portation and copyright liability. 85 On August 5, 1971, after
months of study and public hearings, the FCC sent a letter to Con-
gress outlining its proposed rules for cable television. Dissatisfied
with the compromise reached by the FCC and encouraged by the
White House and the FCC Chairman, the broadcasters, copyright
owners, and cable interests "carved up the cable pie in a manner
more to their liking. [And] .. .the Commission puts its stamp of
approval on the results of these closed door sessions by implement-
ing the precise terms of the industry's agreement."' '
The concurring statement of Chairman Dean Burch, who par-
ticipated in the OTP-sponsored negotiations, disputed Johnson's
conclusions about the negative aspects of the process. Burch saw
nothing wrong with having made another attempt at a negotiated
compromise that would instigate legislation-a course of action
that the Commission had previously urged. OTP was currently
conducting a cable study, wherein all interested parties were as-
serting their viewpoints. The full Commission was not invited to
participate in the negotiations due to practical difficulties.' 87 Al-
though no evidence of impropriety has been discovered, the pro-
cess illustrates the inadequacy of the model legislative/administra-
tive paradigm for conflict resolution. By 1974, when the question
reached the Court once again, Congress still had not responded.
Before Congress would respond, however, cable television would
continue to challenge the resources of the FCC and the Court. In
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,'"8 the
plaintiff urged the Court to take notice of cable television's new
endeavors-program origination, sale of commercials, distant sig-
nal importation, and interconnection with other cable systems.
184. 36 F.C.C.2d at 307 (Comm'r Johnson, concurring and dissenting).
185. Id. at 314.
186. Id. at 310.
187. Id. at 291 (Chairman Burch, concurring).
188. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
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These new operations, the plaintiff argued, made the cable opera-
tor much more like a broadcaster than the earlier community an-
tenna operator that was involved in Fortnightly.'
Again, Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion, and again
he held that within the meaning of the Copyright Act a cable sys-
tem does not "perform" the programs it imports, no matter how
far away the programs come from and no matter what else the sys-
tem may do.19 0 Detailed regulation of the commercial and business
relationships of the communications industry, he said, was a job
for Congress, but Congress, of course, still had not acted."'
In dissent, Justice Douglas exposed the paradox of the major-
ity's deference: by refusing to update the Copyright Act itself, the
Court was usurping the legislative function more than if it were to
move forward. He reasoned that the majority "reads the Copyright
Act out of existence for CATV. That may or may not be desirable
public policy. But it is a legislative decision that not even a ram-
pant judicial activism should entertain."' 9"
By the standards of expertise and independence from industry
and the executive, the Commission's actions failed. By the stan-
dard of achieving compromise in the midst of competing interests,
Congress failed. How difficult is it to conclude, then, that the
courts were no less able to fashion a cable copyright royalty sys-
tem? By design, federal courts have institutional independence.
They could have considered the preferences indicated and the ex-
pert evidence presented by the parties. Federal courts could have
used this information to reach a disinterested result-one that
would have fulfilled the principles of the Copyright Act as well as
the public interest goal of the Communications Act."'
2. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Unfortunately, the story does not have a happy ending. Con-
gress did in fact legislate as to cable television liability in the 1976
Copyright Revision Act. It enacted a compulsory license scheme
that charged cable companies a percentage of their gross receipts
for the number of distant signals they imported."' To administer
189. Id. at 403-04.
190. Id. at 405.
191. Id. at 414 n.16.
192. Id. at 419 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
193. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1982).
194. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1983). The Second Circuit has held that the compulsory license
royalty scheme does not apply to the satellite companies that are the modern equivalents of
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the licensing program, Congress created a commission, the Copy-
right Royalty Tribunal (CRT), to oversee the operation and to ad-
just the rates to reflect inflation or deflation."'
Congress also authorized the CRT to determine new rates for
any additional distant signals that the FCC might subsequently al-
low cable systems to import. At the time, the rules that emanated
from the 1972 FCC Cable Television Report and Order remained
in effect, limiting the number of distant signals a cable system
could import. In 1980, however, the Commission finally eliminated
those rules. 9 ' Thus, cable systems were free to import as many
signals as they desired with only minimal copyright liability for ad-
ditional signals.
This was the contingency Congress had anticipated. The in-
tent was that the CRT would study the new market conditions cre-
ated by deregulation and require reasonable royalties for importa-
tion of the new signals. Unfortunately, Congress failed to give the
CRT the tools with which to do the job-it had a total budget of
community antennae. In Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1232 (1983), the satellite company that retransmitted
the broadcast of Mets's games over WOR in New York to more than 600 cable systems sued
the owner of the New York Mets for a declaratory judgment that it was exempt from copy-
right liability. The rationale of the decision harkens back to Fortnightly and Teleprompter.
Although the holding is that the type of unedited retransmission of signal by Eastern Micro-
wave is exempt from copyright liability under 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3), the court seems to say
that a satellite is more like a viewer than a performer; thus, it does not incur copyright
liability.
195. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-810 (1982). Section 801(b)(2)(A) allows financial updating:
The rates established by section 111(d)(2)(B) may be adjusted to reflect (i)
national monetary inflation or deflation or (ii) changes in the average rates
charged cable subscribers for the basic service of providing secondary transmis-
sions to maintain the real constant dollar level of the royalty fee per subscriber
which existed as of the date of enactment of this Act: Provided, That if the
average rates charged cable system subscribers for the basic service of providing
secondary transmissions are changed so that the average rates exceed national
monetary inflation, no change in the rates established by section 111(d)(2)(B)
shall be permitted: And provided further, That no increase in the royalty fee
shall be permitted based on any reduction in the average number of distant sig-
nal equivalents per subscriber. The Commission may consider all factors relating
to the maintenance of such level of payments including, as an extenuating fac-
tor, whether the cable industry has been restrained by subscriber rate regulating
authorities from increasing the rates for the basic service of providing secondary
transmissions.
196. Report and Order. in Docket Nos. 20988 & 21284, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980), aff'd,
Malrite T.V. v. F.C.C., 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. -denied, National Ass'n of Broad-
casters v. F.C.C., 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); see Zorn, Cable Television: Toward an Improved
Copyright and Communications Policy, 7 COLUM. J. ART & L. 239 (1982); Simon, The Col-
lapse of Consensus: Effects of the Deregulation of Cable Television, 7 COLUM. J. ART. & L.
19 (1982).
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only $487,000 and almost no staff.197 Only one of the five commis-
sioners had any experience in copyright law. The others had expe-
rience only in presidential campaigns. 98
Without an economist or the budget to hire one, the CRT was
forced to rely on the testimony of economic experts retained by the
interested parties. The CRT did not accept a single study in its
entirety. Ultimately, it did set new rates, but without providing
any explanation of the formula by which they were derived. 99
Cable systems and so-called "superstations" (independent stations
that a large number of systems import) objected, claiming that the
royalties are too high. A legal challenge to the rule's reasonableness
proved unsuccessful. 00 Regardless of court determinations of rea-
sonableness, it is clear that the CRT needs more resources if it is
to function effectively. Additionally, future decisions will reveal
whether the CRT will be just another captive agency-in this case,
a captive of copyright holders-or truly independent."'
a. Teletext
The copyright questions involving cable television are far from
over. One recent case involved the use of teletext. Teletext is the
use of gaps in the pulse of the television picture to carry additional
signals.20 The primary image and the teletext are distinct and do
not overlap on the screen. A special device (as in the case of cap-
tioning for the deaf) decodes the teletext for superimposition or for
display on a separate channel of a cable system.
WGN television in Chicago, one of the superstations, trans-
mits its signal via satellite to cable companies around the country
that, in turn, send it to their customers. WGN decided to supple-
ment its copyrighted news program by placing a program guide in
197. A Small Tribunal and Its Big Decision, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1983, at B6, col. 4.
198. Id.
199. 37 C.F.R. § 308.1-.2 (1983).
200. National Cable Television Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
201. See Greenman & Deutsch, The Copyright Royalty Tribunal and The Statutory
Mechanical Royalty: History and Prospect, 1 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 1, 86-90 (1982).
202. See generally Neustadt, Skall & Hammer, The Regulation of Electronic Publish-
ing, 33 FED. CoM. L.J. 331 (1981) (describing teletext and its cousin videotex); P. LYMAN,
CANADA'S VIDEO REVOLUTION 128-39 (1983). Canada and Great Britain have assumed a lead-
ership position in the development of this technology. A recent decision of the United States
Federal Communications Commission authorizing the broadcasting of teletext services
promises to expand the American market. See Teletext Authorized by F.C.C., N.Y. Times,
Apr. 1, 1983, at D1, col. 1. CBS, NBC, and PBS plan to make use of the vertical blanking
interval. Id.; PBS Project With Merrill, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1983, at D8, col. 5.
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the vertical blanking interval during the news program, thereby
implementing teletext. United Video, a satellite company, chose
not to transmit WGN's teletext; instead, it substituted the Dow
Jones business news teletext. WGN sued, claiming that the altera-
tion of the teletext was an unauthorized editing of the copyrighted
broadcast and, as such, constituted an infringement.
In WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video,
Inc.,0 3 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit held that WGN was
correct. For copyright purposes, the news broadcast and the
teletext were one audiovisual work. United Video could choose to
transmit or not to transmit the work, but it could not choose to
transmit only part of it. Posner concluded that teletext is not a
separate program but rather part of a single audiovisual work, even
if the teletext images are not designed to be perceived simultane-
ously, as in the manner of captioning for the deaf.
In reaching his decision, Posner employed the common law
technique of comparing this new invention with an older one, as to
which the law was settled. He wrote:
[T]hough WGN chooses not to use the vertical blanking interval
to overlay additional images on those in the nine o'clock news, it
is clear that United Video may not use it for that purpose with-
out WGN's permission, any more than if the publisher of a book
leaves the inside covers blank the book seller (or book whole-
saler, to make the analogy more precise) may inscribe the Lord's
Prayer on them in order to broaden the book's appeal. '
WGN's use of teletext, the court said, had many analogues in
older technology. A dictionary, for example, could be copyrighted
even though its entries were not intended to be read sequentially.
Similarly, a history book may include a fold-out map. "In short,"
Posner wrote, "we cannot see that the difference between a one-
and a two-channel program is much more profound than that be-
tween a silent movie and a talkie. '20 5 If television technology re-
quired two channels, one for the picture and one for the sound,
Posner said, the copyright of the program certainly would include
both. '
Having engaged in creative judging, Posner decided to justify
it as exercising power delegated by Congress rather than power in-
203. 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982).
204. Id. at 626.
205. Id. at 627.
206. Id. In fact, the audio component of a television program is an FM signal.
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trinsic to the court. The judge read the broad definition of "audio-
visual work"2 7 and the legislative history of the 1976 Act 2°s as in-
dications that Congress "wanted the courts to interpret the
definitional provisions of the new act flexibly, so that it would
cover new technologies as they appeared, rather than to interpret
those provisions narrowly and so force Congress periodically to up-
date the act."2 9
Perhaps Posner's apologia justifies his opinion to those who
view judicial competence more narrowly. Perhaps he himself
thought it necessary to link his opinion to some legislative authori-
zation. Whatever the case, the delegatory language should not ob-
scure the fact that the court was engaged more in updating the
statute than in interpreting the legislative intent. The common law
method proved adequate to the task.
b. Home Satellite Dishes
Another new issue, related to the cable importation of distant
signals, arises out of the proliferation of home satellite receivers.2 1
Most cable programming now is distributed via satellite, just as
United Video relayed WGN's signal to cable systems across the
country. For less than $5,000, an individual can buy a receiving
dish. The dishes can directly intercept signals for television recep-
tion. The legal difficulty, of course, is that the cable compulsory
license royalty system is bypassed. The viewer gets the program
without paying a royalty, either directly or indirectly through a
cable company, to the copyright holder.
In many cases, the home satellite dish owner gets more than
207. "Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices
such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying
sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or
tapes, in which the works are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
208. In a Delphic passage, the House report states that "[tihe bill does not intend ei-
ther to freeze the scope of copyrightable technology or to allow unlimited expansion to areas
completely outside the present congressional intent." 693 F.2d at 628 (quoting H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976)). Posner took this passage as a warrant to treat new
forms of technology by analogizing to the old. The judge, however, spoke of this as a mode
of interpretation, not as a delegation of authority. 693 F.2d at 628.
209. Id. at 627. The judge limited the scope of his opinion by stating that the outcome
would be different if the teletext were completely unrelated-a cartoon show for
preschoolers in the midst of the news. Id. at 628. In that case, he said, the teletext and the
main signal could not be considered related images within the meaning of § 101 of the Copy-
right Act. Id.
210. See generally A. EASTON, THE HOME SATELLITE TV BOOK (1982).
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the basic cable programs. He also can receive pay cable services
such as Home Box Office (HBO), for which subscribers pay a pre-
mium. To thwart interception by home satellite dishes, HBO be-
gan scrambling its signal. 11 Where scrambling occurs, however, un-
scrambling cannot be far behind. Home-built decoders
undoubtedly will become available. One group has proposed a com-
pulsory license system for dish owners, with royalties coming out
of the price of the equipment. So far, however, copyright holders
have rejected the suggestion.21
The legal issue harkens back to Fortnightly. If the satellite
dish is like an antenna that only increases the range of signals that
can be received, then-following the Fortnightly logic-it creates
no copyright liability. Nothing is being "performed." Since the Su-
preme Court decided Fortnightly and Teleprompter, Congress has
imposed the cable compulsory licensing system. Thus, any court
that considers this home satellite dish issue also must consider the
effect of that statute on the legal terrain.213 Congress has altered
the balance, and the question is now whether a home satellite dish
is analogous to a cable system that must pay royalties for import-
ing distant signals.
If that is the case, though, either Congress or the courts will
have to devise a different royalty scheme. Cable systems can be
monitored for the signals they import. Homes cannot be moni-
tored, at least not without a serious intrusion of privacy. As a re-
sult, a court that finds the analogy between home dish and cable
importation appropriate will have two choices: 1) it can devise a
royalty system, or 2) it can attempt to force Congress to act by
refusing to impose such a system on its own.
211. HBO to Scramble Its Signal, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1983, at B2, col. 1. Section 5 of
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2802, which does
not address copyright liability, amended the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605,
to allow home reception of unscrambled signals for which a marketing system has not been
established. H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H10,427, 10,446 (daily ed. Oct.
1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rose).
212. See TV 'Dish' Makers Fight Their Own 'Star Wars', N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1983, at
A22, col. 4; Note, Satellite/Dish Antenna Technology: A Copyright Owners' Dilemma, 59
IND. L.J. 417, 441 (1984).
213. When statutes supplanted the common law in the early twentieth century, the
relationship of those statutes to the common law was called into question. By the 1930's,
James Landis argued that the common law should not be a closed system but that it should
be open to the influence of statutes. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD
LEGAL ESSAYs 213 (1934); see also Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17
CATH. U.L. REv. 401 (1968) (recognizing the value of legislative action but only so long as the
common law framework remains the predominant scheme).
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Of course, a home satellite receiver may not be like a commu-
nity television antenna at all. The signals it receives were never
intended for direct acquisition by the public, especially when
scrambled. It does not simply boost the range of reception; it cre-
ates an entirely new range. Home satellite dish manufacturers ar-
gue that programmers, by sending their signals through the public
airways, invite the public to intercept their signals. In contrast, one
might compare the situation to the DuPont case in which the court
restrained the aerial photographer from making use of photographs
he took while flying over a plant. " He was in a place he had a
right to be, but the court ruled that did not give him the right to
take the plaintiff's property-its trade secret.
The trade secret aspect of the case, however, creates a flaw in
the analogy. DuPont was taking steps to keep its process out of the
public domain. The court said that it therefore should not be re-
quired to take the additional unreasonable step of erecting a roof
over its plant while it was under construction. Satellite signals,
however, are not secrets. They are widely disclosed to subscribers
of cable systems. Nor are they special methods of conducting busi-
ness. Rather, they are the business themselves. Perhaps the more
accurate cause of action would be misappropriation,215 but the sta-
tus of misappropriation is uncertain in light of the copyright pre-
emption section. 21 6 At best, it would be a risky theory on which to
rely. Courts undoubtedly will have a difficult time deciding
whether this common law cause of action is still available and, if
not, determining whether the Copyright Act again must be up-
dated to accommodate the new technology.
III. HOME VIDEOTAPING-FAIR USE OR INFRINGEMENT?
The controversy over home videotaping provides a recent case
study of the problem of technology evolving faster than the law of
copyright. Manufacturers introduced home videotape equipment
around 1975, the year before Congress passed the Copyright Revi-
sion Act. The Act, however, is silent on this particular subject.
Now, millions of viewers are equipped to tape programs off the air.
Despite all the disagreements on policy among program pro-
ducers, broadcasters, manufacturers, retailers, and users, the legal
issues involved can be reduced to three questions: 1) is home vide-
214. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
216. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
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otaping off the air fair use; 2) is such taping analogous to home
audio taping off the air, which Congress arguably has allowed; and
3) if home videotaping is an infringement of copyright, what is the
proper remedy? Insofar as judicial competence is concerned, the
most difficult of the three questions is the last one-the remedy.
The fair use provision of the Copyright Act2 17 explicitly directs
the courts to balance the public and private interests. Although
fair use was judicially created, Congress eventually codified the
doctrine in an open-ended fashion. Consequently, the courts cer-
tainly are competent to undertake a fair use analysis. Congress in-
tended them to do so, saying in its House committee report that
"especially during a period of rapid technological change .. .the
courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations
on a case-by-case basis.121 8
A California district court, analyzing the fair use factors, in
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America219 held that
home taping was indeed fair use. The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals disagreed,220 finding the fact that the copying occurs at home
to be relevant to but not determinative of the first factor-"the
purpose and character of the use."'221 If a court deems home use to
constitute fair use, then the same argument could be made for any
home copying, be it of records, tapes, books, or magazines. Such
extensive application of the fair use doctrine would substantially
alter the balance between authors' rights and the public's rights.
The "nature of the copyrighted work '222 also provides little
comfort for the pro-copying position. The legislative history and
case law with respect to this fair use factor indicate that when a
work is of an informational rather than creative type, the work is
more likely to fall within the scope of fair use.223 The Ninth Circuit
again disagreed with the finding of the district court, saying that
the mode of delivery-via public airwaves-is irrelevant to the
217. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
218. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5659, 5680.
219. 480 F. Supp. 429, 456 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
220. 659 F.2d at 971, 974. For a fuller discussion of both lower courts' fair use holdings,
see Haft, Universal City Studios v. Sony Corporation of America: The Case Against Fair
Use, 7 COLUM. J. ART. & L. 85 (1982).
221. 659 F.2d at 972 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1976)).
222. The "nature of the copyrighted work" is the second factor enumerated in § 107 as
determinative of whether the alleged infringing use falls within the fair use exception.
223. 659 F.2d at 972.
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analysis of this fair use factor.224 The chosen mode of distribution
does not create a license to copy the programs, only to view them.
The third factor listed in the statute-the amount of the work cop-
ied 225-weighs heavily against home copying because the entire
work usually is being copied.226
Courts consider the fourth factor-harm to the market for the
copyrighted work 22 7 -to be the most important. The district court
found the harm to be speculative and minimal.228 It viewed time-
shifting as no threat to the audience for other programs. It
doubted that many people would create video archives; if they did,
they would purchase video discs or authorized videotapes rather
than keep off-the-air tapes that include commercials and are ed-
ited for television. 22e The district court considered the time period
during which the case arose and expressed doubt that many people
would spend $875 for a recorder and $20 per tape.23 0
In contrast, the appellate court focused on the future. Con-
cerned with the cumulative effect of mass home videotaping of
copyrighted works,3 1 the Ninth Circuit attempted to fashion a rul-
ing that would be adaptable to new technology. Rather than forc-
ing the plaintiff to prove actual damages-a difficult task when
dealing with individual home users-the Ninth Circuit determined
that the proper standard was proof of a tendency to diminish the
potential market. That, the court said, the plaintiffs had proven.23 2
The Supreme Court undertook its analysis with a parodox.
The majority stated that "[slound policy, as well as history, sup-
ports our consistent deference to Congress when major technologi-
cal innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. '233
Then, it went on to acknowledge that section 107-fair
use-"identifies various factors that enable a Court to apply an
'equitable rule of reason' analysis to particular claims of infringe-
ment. ' '23 4 Looking for something it could not possibly find in the
224. Id.
225. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1982).
226. 659 F.2d at 973.
227. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982).
228. 480 F. Supp. at 451, 467.
229. Id. at 467.
230. Id. at 451.
231. 659 F.2d at 974. The court compared home videotaping to photocopying, siding
with the dissenters in Williams & Wilkins, who viewed the future of unrestricted photo-
copying with alarm. Id.; see supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
232. 659 F.2d at 974.
233. 104 S. Ct. at 783.
234. Id. at 792. The "equitable rule of reason" language comes from the House Report
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fair use section-specific legislation on home videotaping-the ma-
jority held that such taping of broadcast television programs for
time-shifting was fair use and therefore legal.
Absent from the majority opinion is anything but the most
cursory discussion of what is clear in the statute: section 106(1)
prohibits the making of a copy of a copyrighted work.23 Such a
preliminary finding must be assumed; for otherwise, fair use would
not be an issue. It arises only upon a claim that copyright infringe-
ment is excused in a particular situation. The fact that section 106
has been violated should be important to any court that claims to
be deferring to Congress, because statutory language is the clearest
evidence of congressional intent. Fair use may provide an excuse,
but the burden should be on the infringing party to show why the
usual rule should not apply.2 36 In a speculative case such as Sony,
where the section 107 factors do not clearly mandate a finding of
fair use, the deferential approach would be to hold the use infring-
ing. Congress, if it wished, could alter the balance.
As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent, the majority dis-
cussed only two of the four factors contained in the fair use sec-
on the 1976 Act. The majority's reliance on this language is curious, as it purports to be
bound by congressional intent. In fact, that report makes clear Congress's intent was to
allow the courts to resolve fair use problems involving new technology. Id. at 792 n.31. The
Report stated:
The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair
use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially
during a period of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory
explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the
courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-
case basis.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659, 5680.
235. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) provides:
Subject to sections 107 [fair use] through 118, the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the pub-
lic by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
236. But cf. 104 S. Ct. at 793 (a claim of infringement by noncommercial use of a copy-
righted work requires plaintiff to prove harm from such use).
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tion.2 7 Moreover, it mischaracterized the first factor. Section
107(1) directs a court to consider "the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes. "238 The majority, however,
omitted the word "educational" from its discussion. It accepted
the district court's conclusion that home time-shifting is noncom-
mercial and nonprofit, never bothering to inquire whether it was
"educational. ' 23 9
Justice Blackmun more closely adhered to congressional in-
tent. He observed that section 107 itself enumerates examples of
fair use-"criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . schol-
arship, or research."24 0 The Senate and House reports underscore
this "productive" requirement of the fair use doctrine.24 Such use
is helpful to society and, thus, in harmony with the precepts of the
237. 104 S. Ct. at 817 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
238. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982).
239. 104 S. Ct. at 792-93. Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's analysis: "There is
no indication that the fair use doctrine has any application for purely personal consumption
on the scale involved in this case, and the Court's application of it here deprives fair use of
the major cohesive force that has guided evolution of the doctrine in the past." Id. at 816
(footnote omitted).
240. Id. at 807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
241. Id. Examples of fair use cited in the congressional reports included the following:
[Q]uotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or
comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, for illus-
tration or clarification of the author's observations; use in a parody of some of
the content of the work parodied; summary of an address or article, with brief
quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a portion of a work to
replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a teacher or student of a small
part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduction of a work in legislative or
judicial proceedings or reports; incidental and fortuitous reproduction, in a
newsreel or broadcast, of a work located in the scene of an event being reported.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659, 5678-79.
The majority admits that "copying to promote a scholarly endeavor certainly has a
stronger claim to fair use than copying to avoid interrupting a poker game." 104 S. Ct. at
795 n.40. Nevertheless, it concludes that the productive/nonproductive distinction is not
determinative of a fair use question. It then goes on to compare home time-shifting to copy-
ing a work for the convenience of a blind person-a use identified as fair by the House
committee-and using a videotape recorder to allow a hospital patient to see programs he
otherwise would miss. Id. at 795-96 n.40. The majority concludes that "[v]irtually any time-
shifting that increases viewer access to television programming may result in a comparable
benefit." Id. at 796 n.40. Thus, despite the earlier disclaimer, the poker player is given a
greater claim than the scholar, because the scholar is not free to make complete copies of
often-checked-out books for himself or his students. To the contrary, educational organiza-
tions, authors, and publishers have agreed to restrictive teacher photocopying guidelines
that the House Report described as a "reasonable interpretation of the minimum standards
of fair use." H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 72, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5685-86; see supra note 62.
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copyright clause. "But," as Blackmun wrote, "when a user repro-
duces an entire work and uses it for its original purpose, with no
added benefit to the public, the doctrine of fair use usually does
not apply. There is then no need whatsoever to provide the ordi-
nary user with a fair use subsidy at the author's expense."242
Not only did the majority omit discussion of the productivity
concept of fair use, but it also introduced a radical new concept
into copyright and fair use analysis-that the nature of the deliv-
ery system is relevant to the question of unauthorized reproduc-
tion. The Court observed that time-shifting simply allows a viewer
to see a program he had been invited to see-via commercial tele-
vision airwaves-free of charge. Thus, the Court concluded, the re-
cording of that program for viewing at a later time qualified as
noncommercial. 43
In so stating, the Court missed the putative purpose of copy-
right. What is important is not the nature of the delivery system
but rather the rights that the author retains in the work that is
delivered. By granting a license to a television station, the copy-
right holder authorizes a one-time performance of his film. The
fact that the television station does not charge a fee for watching
the film is irrelevant to the relationship between the viewer and
the copyright holder. The effect of the Court's holding is to convert
a one-time license into a multiple-showing license.2 4
In mentioning the free nature of the performance, the majority
sub silentio raises a considerable number of questions about other
forms of home taping. For example, is the taping of a movie from a
subscription or cable television service fair use? Does the fact that
the customer has paid for one viewing entitle him to copy the pro-
gram and view it at any time? If so, how can a copyright holder
ever license his material for television delivery and retain his
rights? If not, how can pay television taping be prevented while
free television taping is allowed?24 5
242. 104 S. Ct. at 808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 792.
244. Blackmun gives as an example a book borrowed from the public library that may
not be copied any more freely than a book that is bought. Id. at 808 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). A closer example is a free public showing of a movie. The sponsor may have paid for a
one-performance license, but his decision not to charge admission in no way allows a viewer
to set up a video camera and record the film off the screen.
245. The day of the Sony decision, Sid Sheinberg, president of MCA Inc., the parent
company of Universal Pictures, indicated that MCA might initiate a lawsuit attacking the
taping of programs off cable and pay television. "Our original suit very pointedly did not
address cable," Sheinberg said. "Cable is a contractual matter in no way similar to taping
off the public airwaves." An Unhappy Hollywood Weighs the Next Move, N.Y. Times, Jan.
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The consequence of unbridled taping is that the value of the
work for subsequent license decreases. A film company may license
a movie for several television showings, knowing that those who
were not able to see the first performance may tune in for a later
one. Similarly, the broadcasters are willing to pay for an additional
license with the knowledge that a significant audience will remain.
If one can tape the first performance and view it at his leisure,
however, he is less likely to watch the movie the second time it
airs. Accordingly, the broadcaster is less willing to pay for multiple
showings. Ultimately, the copyright holder is deprived of the value
of his product.
Moreover, by allowing laissez-faire home copying, the Court
has depreciated the secondary market for videocassettes of feature
films. These authorized cassettes, produced by the studios them-
selves, are less attractive at thirty dollars or so when one can tape
the same movie off the air for the cost of a blank cassette and re-
tain it for viewing at his leisure. Assuming arguendo that the num-
ber of persons wishing to keep copies of movies is small, the ability
of potential customers to obtain the same product for the price of
a blank videotape seriously affects that market-whatever its size.
Although the Court may have premised its decision on the finding
that most taping is for time-shifting purposes, its edict has made it
impossible to prevent librarying.
These are some of the arguments that the petitioners
presented in arguing that the fourth factor of section 107-"the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work" 2 46-pointed against a finding of fair use. View-
ing the evidence presented to the district court in 1979, when home
videotaping was in its infancy, the Court concluded that no likeli-
hood of harm existed.4
By making such a determination, the Court ignored the ex-
press language of the statute requiring consideration of the impact
on the "potential" market for or value of the work. Justice Black-
mun observed in dissent that "[t]he Studios have demonstrated a
potential for harm, which has not been, and could not be, refuted
at this early stage of technological development. '"24 8 Once the
18, 1984, at D21, col. 4.
246. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982).
247. 104 S. Ct. at 794-95.
248. Id. at 810 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In 1980, after the district court decision,
sales of video cassette recorders still totalled less than one million units a year. Annual sales
of blank tapes amounted to 15 million. By 1983, dealers sold more than four million video-
[Vol. 38:769
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
plaintiffs established a violation of section 106, the burden should
have been on the defendants to prove that no damage to the po-
tential market would occur. Instead, the Court required the plain-
tiffs to establish that it would occur. Given a reasonable showing of
potential harm, the Court should have resolved the issue in favor
of the aggrieved party-the copyright holder. Lack of any immedi-
ate damage has never been a basis for precluding a copyright
holder from preventing unauthorized copying of his work.
Justice Blackmun points out that the majority all but ignores
the second and third factors of the fair use statute: the nature of
the copyrighted work and the quantitative portion of the work
used by the alleged infringer. Both of these considerations weigh
heavily against a finding of fair use in this case.24  Thus, it is the
dissent, rather than the majority, that adheres more closely to the
intent of Congress. What the majority mistakes for deference is, in
fact, a broad usurping of the balance struck in the Copyright Act.
. Unless one believes that the Copyright Act must explicitly ad-
dress every possible form of reproduction, the inquiry in Sony cer-
tainly is of the type that courts are competent to conduct. No fur-
ther congressional action is necessary unless Congress wants to
alter the balance. It could have done so at any time but was never
compelled to consider the issue until it came before the courts.2 5
By holding that home copying is fair use, the Court has made
meaningful legislation addressing a remedy for mass video copying
next to impossible. What congressman will want to be known as
the one who fought for a tax on tapes?2
51
The second major question in the home videotaping case is
whether a court ought to treat home videotaping off the air like
tape recorders (VTRs) each year, along with 57 million blank tapes. See The Home Video
Decision: Some Unresolved Issues Remain, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1984, at D21, cols. 3, 6.
249. Id. at 817 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun observed that Sony's own survey
indicated that entertainment programs, as opposed to informational or productive pro-
grams, accounted for 80% of the programs recorded, a fact cutting against a finding of fair
use under factor two-the nature of the copyrighted work. Id. Factor three, the amount of
the work copied, is even more devastating to the majority's analysis, according to Blackmun,
as it is undisputed that virtually all VTR users record entire works. Id.
250. See generally Rapson, Legislative Relief and the Betamax Problem, 7 COLUM. J.
ART. & L. 125, 132 (1982) (discussing the implications of Sony).
251. In the wake of the Sony decision, Rep. Robert Kastenmeier, chairman of the Judi-
ciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Jus-
tice, which has jurisdiction over copyright, said "it would seem to me that Congress will not
be disposed in light of the Court's decision to act on legislation calling for imposition of
royalties on home taping." Entertainment Industry Vows Fight in Congress, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 18, 1984, at D20, col. 5.
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home audio taping off the air. In passing the 1971 Record Piracy
Amendment to the Copyright Act, Congress arguably exempted
home recording of broadcasts of sound recordings from copyright
infringement liability.25 2 The district court cited testimony from
the then-Assistant Register of Copyrights that banning home tap-
ing would not control commercial bootlegging of video tapes.2"'
The court also cited legislative debate, in which the chairman of
the House subcommittee responsible for the bill said that a home
audio recording of a television program would not be considered an
offense.2 4 Thus, while Congress danced around this future issue, it
did not resolve it.
The Ninth Circuit considered the purported audio taping ex-
emption and concluded that it should not be extended to videotap-
ing. Its reasoning was based on other sections of the Copyright Act,
in which Congress displayed special solicitude for audiovisual
works.2 55 Thus, this was not a question of treating like cases alike.
The cases are different. Accordingly, the appeals court determined
that they ought to be treated differently.
Having concluded that the Copyright Act in general did not
prohibit home taping, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to
reach this issue. The dissent addressed the question and deter-
mined that, regardless whether audio taping is allowed, videotap-
ing is not a case of the same type. Prior to the Sound Recording
Amendment of 1971, home recording was thought to be "common
and unrestrained, '256 but that was because until the passage of
that legislation, Congress had not afforded copyright protection to
phonograph records. In contrast, television broadcasts and motion
pictures were within the purview of the 1909 Act. They enjoyed
full protection. At most, Congress designed the 1971 Amendment
to address the problem of commercial record piracy.2 57 In a per-
fectly congruent world, audiotaping and videotaping would be
treated alike. Indeed, Congress considered legislation that would
252. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1566, 1572.
253. 480 F. Supp. at 445.
254. Id. at 446.
255. 659 F.2d at 966-67. The court cited specific sections of the 1976 Act: § 108(h),
which excludes most audiovisual works from library reproduction rights; § 110(1), which
excludes unauthorized copies of audiovisual works from classroom teaching rights; and §
112(a), which excludes audiovisual works from broadcast archive rights. 17 U.S.C. §§ 108(h),
110(i), 112(a) (1982).
256. 104 S. Ct. at 805 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
257. Id.
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have provided a royalty-collecting remedy for both forms of tap-
ing.2"' Nonetheless, given the special background of sound record-
ings, it would be a mistake to extend application of the 1971
Amendment to other kinds of taping.
The remedy for home videotaping, however, presents a more
difficult problem for a court. The district court refused to issue an
injunction against the sale and manufacture of home videotape
machines and video tapes. The court also declined to order the
manufacturers to modify their machines so that they would be un-
able to tape off the air. This was not an appropriate action, the
judge said, when actual infringement is doubtful. Additionally, he
was concerned about depriving the public of new technology capa-
ble of noninfringing uses. 259 Beyond that, he spoke of the tremen-
dous threat to individual privacy posed by a system of enforce-
ment. The machines, after all, are used in private homes.260
The court of appeals, although no more sanguine about the
complexity of a remedy, wrote that "[t]he difficulty of fashioning
relief cannot. . . dissuade the federal courts from affording appro-
priate relief to those whose rights have been infringed.""2 ' As a re-
sult, it remanded to the district court for the purpose of creating a
remedy. In so doing, the court of appeals hinted that where an in-
junction might involve significant social costs, the better alterna-
tive might be damages or a continuing royalty.2 2
Justice Blackmun's dissent suggests that the Supreme Court
majority shied away from a correct decision on liability because of
the difficulty of fashioning relief. 263 The majority worried about
how to restrain infringing copying without preventing authorized
taping. 64 The Court fretted over the possibility of banning produc-
258. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
259. 480 F. Supp. at 463-64, 468.
260. Id. at 468.
261. 659 F.2d at 976.
262. Id.
263. 104 S. Ct. at 818 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 789. The record included one movie that was uncopyrighted as well as testi-
mony from various professional sports league commissioners that they would allow time-
shifting copying. Id. at 789 n.23, 789-90. The Court also pointed to various religious and
educational programs as free for home taping. Id. at 790. Additionally, the Court cited the
testimony of Fred Rogers, who produces a children's program called Mr. Rogers' Neighbor-
hood. Id. Rogers said he welcomed home taping of his program. Id. at 790 n.27. Of course,
Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood is both a nonprofit and educational program. The § 107 factors
may well support a finding of fair use for taping of such a show, but that in no way justifies
taping of major motion pictures. Similarly, the fact that some commercial program suppliers
choose to countenance home taping does not justify stripping the reproduction right from
those copyright holders who do not. If that logic were applied to analogous situations, any
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tion of an item that could be used for noninfringing purposes.2 65
Despite the fact that the manufacturers promoted the machines
with the prospect of taping programs off the air, it hesitated to
extend liability to them for copyright infringement, because the
manufacturers' products can be used to make both authorized and
unauthorized uses of copyrighted material and the manufacturers
have no control over the use made of their products. 266
The spectre of a court devising a remedy for this complex
problem troubles some commentators.67 One alternative form of
relief is the fashioning of a compulsory license system in the form
of a tax on the sale of tapes and equipment. Indeed, this is the
solution suggested in Senator Mathias's proposal, which was
stalled in Congress once the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Sony." It may well be preferable for Congress to enact such a sys-
tem, but it is not so complex that it is beyond a court's competence
in the absence of such legislation. An institution that can manage
the desegregation of school districts and the reapportionment of
legislatures certainly is capable of fashioning a form of relief for
copyright owners whose programs are illegally taped.26 9
About the only alternative the Supreme Court did not con-
sider was to find infringement, thereby forcing Congress to wrestle
with the issue and fashion a remedy. This is the approach the D.C.
Circuit used in American Bankers Association v. Connell 70 The
court declared that a banking statute governing fund transfers was
outdated in light of new technology and techniques used by finan-
cial institutions, but it delayed implementation of its ruling for
eight months. This stay gave Congress the opportunity to update
the law. Similarly, in Sony, the Court could have found that home
videotaping is an infringement and allowed Congress several
book in the library would be subject to complete copying because the publishers of some of
the books encouraged reproduction.
265. 104 S. Ct. at 788.
266. Id. at 786.
267. See, e.g., Kurz, supra note 144; Rapson, supra note 250.
268. Amendment No. 1333 to S. 1758, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Germany and Aus-
tria both use this type of approach to compensate creators of music and broadcasts for
reproduction of their works. See Kurz, supra note 144, at 274; Seamann, Sound and Video-
Recording and the Copyright Law: The German Approach, 2 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 225
(1983).
269. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
270. [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) D 97,785 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated without opinion, 595 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The case is discussed in G. CALA-
BRESI, supra note 1, at 159-61 and accompanying notes.
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months to respond. This dialogue would have allowed the Court to
resolve the legal issue in the case and also afforded Congress the
opportunity to provide the means of redress.
The consequences of the Court's determination that home tap-
ing does not constitute an infringement of copyright holders' rights
are enormous. The conclusion that home noncommercial copying is
acceptable creates a precedent that will radically alter the balance
of authors' and the public's rights. As home computers proliferate,
users will argue that any noncommercial home copying of material
from a data base is fair use.2 71 This is wrong.
In Sony, the Supreme Court once again demonstrated its im-
portance in the area of evolving technology. The Court appears so
befuddled by any new machine that it cannot see that the machine
does the same thing an older machine does, just in a different way.
Thus, it persists in fruitless searches for specific mention of a new
technology in the statute instead of looking to the type of acts the
statute prohibits. Copying, be it by a printing press, a videotape
recorder, or a computer, is copying. If the photocopying of a library
book for home use is not fair use, then one is hard pressed to find a
principled reason for treating the taping of a television program
any differently. Like cases should be treated alike. Any decision
that does not heed this admonition is the antithesis of deference to
Congress.
Justice Blackmun described the situation accurately:
It is no answer, of course, to say and stress, as the Court does,
this Court's "consistent deference to Congress" whenever "major
technological innovations" appear .... Perhaps a better and
more accurate description is that the Court has tended to evade
the hard issues when they arise in the area of copyright law. I
see no reason for the Court to be particularly pleased with this
tradition or to continue it.272
IV. CONCLUSION
An inability to keep up with technology plagues American in-
tellectual property law. The more courts rely on Congress to pro-
vide answers to all questions, the more serious the problem be-
comes. What is needed is a legal institution with the vitality to
determine how new forms of technology fit into existing policy
choices.
271. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
272. 104 S. Ct. at 797 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Of the alternative decisionmaking institutions currently avail-
able-the courts, Congress, administrative agencies, and the execu-
tive branch-the courts are the most capable of ongoing updating.
The questions first appear in the courts as parties seek declara-
tions of their rights with respect to new technology, in the context
of existing technology and related policies and rules, and determi-
nations of whether these rules should govern. This is nothing more
than treating like cases alike, the common law function that courts
are well-suited to perform.
If they are to fulfill this mission in intellectual property cases,
though, courts must go beyond updating the common law. They
must move toward a system such as that proposed by Calabresi, in
which they bring statutes up-to-date as well. Critics may contend
that such a shift will usurp important policy choices that the rep-
resentative branch of government ought to make. The criticism
falls short of the mark for two reasons. First, the representative
branch already has spoken. The courts will not be imposing their
own value choices. Rather, they will be fitting new technology into
the choices already reflected in the statutes. Secondly, if Congress
does not like a decision, it always can change it.
Occasionally, courts have been willing to take a few tentative
steps toward assuming such a function. Usually, though, they jus-
tify their actions in terms of interpretation rather than updating.
Indeed, in a few instances such as fair use, Congress clearly did
intend the courts to act expansively. These outposts, however, are
hard-pressed to accommodate all of the questions new technology
creates. Thus, they are useful as far as they go, but they do not go
far enough.
In a system in which Congress responded quickly and com-
pletely to all intellectual property questions arising out of new
technology, judicial activism might not be necessary. That is not
the system in the United States, however. The fact that the Copy-
right Act went sixty-seven years without a major overhaul is indic-
ative of congressional insensitivity to these issues.
Common law courts not only can function effectively in the
ages of intellectual property, they also can ensure that the law is as
dynamic as the subject it governs. The choice is not between judi-
cial or congressional action. It is between judicial action and, often,
no congressional action at all. That being the case, the right choice
is clear.
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